Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) for agriculture in developing countries by Mullen, Kathleen et al.
 




PRODUCER SUPPORT ESTIMATES (PSEs) FOR AGRICULTURE 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND 
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM INDIA AND CHINA 
 
 






Markets, Trade and Institutions Division 
 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 















MTID Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a 
full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.  It is expected that most Discussion 
Papers will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised.  





PRODUCER SUPPORT ESTIMATES (PSEs) FOR AGRICULTURE 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND 
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM INDIA AND CHINA 
 
 






Markets, Trade and Institutions Division 
 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 













MTID Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a 
full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.  It is expected that most Discussion 
Papers will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised. 
    
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This paper is part of an effort at IFPRI during 2002-2004 to understand and 
assess agricultural policies among selected developing countries. Support from the 
Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Center for 
Development Research (ZEF), Bonn, the National Natural Science Foundation of China 
(grant 70203013), the World Bank, and the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR) are gratefully acknowledged. We have benefited from 
dialogue with researchers at OECD and FAO on the modeling and policy issues 
addressed in this analysis. We thank Xinshen Diao, Ulrike Grote and an anonymous 
reviewer for helpful comments. We have also benefited from discussion at presentations 
of parts of this paper at the annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics 
Association, Denver, August 1-3, 2004, a seminar at ERS, Washington D.C., January 29, 
2004, the CAAS-IFPRI Conference on ￿The Dragon and the Elephant: Rural 
Development and Agricultural Reform Experiences in China and India,￿ Beijing, 
November 10-11, 2003, and a workshop at FAO, Rome, October 23, 2003.  
  ii 
ABSTRACT 
In many developing countries, governments rely on price-based measures 
(including border protection and subsidies on inputs and outputs) more than on budgetary 
payments to achieve agricultural policy objectives defined to include price stabilization 
or food self-sufficiency. Assessing the effects of these price-based measures is thus 
important to evaluating whether agriculture is being protected or disprotected by 
commodity or in the aggregate. This aspect of producer support estimates (PSEs) is 
simple to describe conceptually but difficult to evaluate well empirically. Developing 
countries may face higher international transport and port costs for imports and exports 
than developed countries or may have substantial internal handling, transportation and 
processing costs. Separating these structural effects on farmers from agricultural policy 
effects that drive a wedge between the domestic farmgate price and an adjusted 
international reference price requires extensive data and judgments.  
In this paper, we describe the PSE measurement issues and illustrate their 
importance. We estimate product-specific market price support, budget expenditures and 
PSEs for three important agricultural commodities (wheat, rice and corn) in India (1985-
2002), using representative disaggregated state-level results, and for five commodities 
(wheat, rice, corn, soybeans and sugar) in China (1995-2001). The results for India 
suggest that ignoring factors such as internal transport costs, marketing margins and 
quality differences can result in inaccurate price support estimates and PSEs that may be 
of the wrong sign. We also explore how relaxing or changing certain standard PSE 
assumptions (such as altering the ￿scaling up￿ procedure or computing the PSE as a 
percentage of value of production at world reference prices) can have large impacts on 
the results. Finally, for commodities that are near self-sufficiency, we follow Byerlee and 
Morris (1993) and define a relevant adjusted reference price based on the relationship 
between an estimated autarky price and the import and export prices. We discuss this 
procedure and use the resulting reference prices to compute the market price support 
component of the PSE for India.   iii 
Based on our three-commodity PSEs for India, support is largely counter-
cyclical, rising when world prices are low (as in the late 1980s and 1990s) and falling 
when world prices strengthen (as in the mid 1990s). From our more preliminary five-
commodity PSE estimates for China, a trend decline in disprotection is more evident. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Various indicators of agricultural protection can be computed to measure the 
degree of subsidization or taxation of the agricultural sector as a whole and of important 
commodities individually.  In contrast to the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) on 
which production-related domestic support commitments are based under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), the 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is a broader measure of the transfers to farmers from 
border protection and domestic policy interventions. It is defined by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as ￿an indicator of the annual 
monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural 
producers, measured at the farmgate level, arising from policy measures that support 
agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or 
income￿ (OECD, 2002 p. 59). Thus, the PSE includes transfers arising through market-
intervention domestic and border policies and direct payments to producers. The OECD￿s 
calculation of PSEs has been limited to its member countries and some transition 
economies, but others have applied variants of the approach to several developing 
countries (Pursell and Gupta, 1996; ValdØs, 1996; Cheng and Sun, 1998; Gulati and 
Narayanan, 2003; Cheng 2001; Tian et al., 2002).   
                                                 
1 The authors are, respectively, former Senior Research Assistant in the Markets, Trade and Institutions 
Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (MTID/IFPRI), Washington D.C.;  Associate 
Professor and Director (sunds@mail.caas.net.cn), Trade Division, Institute of Agricultural Economics, 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS); Senior Research Fellow (d.orden@cigar.org), 
MTID/IFPRI; and Director (a.gulati@cigar.org), MTID/IFPRI. 2 
In this paper we describe and assess the PSE methodology and make applications 
to India and China. Because developing countries often rely more on border support and 
other price-based policy measures (input and/or output price controls) than on fiscally-
budgeted support payments, most of the protection or disprotection of producers may be 
given by the gap between domestic and international output or input prices. In comparing 
a country￿s domestic price to an international price, an accurate estimate of the policy-
related gap must account for factors such as external and internal transport costs and 
marketing margins, as well as processing costs and quality differences between the 
products being compared. Moreover, the net trade status of the commodity in question 
may itself be the result of policies in place and attention must be directed to determining 
the appropriate price that would prevail in the absence of the policies.   
One objective of this paper is simply to describe these measurement and 
conceptual issues. Then, taking these factors into account, we apply the PSE 
methodology to three commodities (wheat, rice and corn) in India for the period 1985-
2002 (2003 for wheat), using disaggregated analysis for representative surplus and deficit 
states, and to five commodities (wheat, rice, corn, soybeans and sugar) in China for the 
period 1995-2001.
2 These two countries both are large agricultural producers, as well as 
importers and exporters, and have undergone varying degrees of agricultural policy 
reforms. The policy reform processes in India and China display a gradual transition from 
an autarkic and state-led setting to a more deregulated market environment with greater 
integration into the world economy and a new and larger role for the private sector. The 
reform process has not been uniform over time or across the two countries, and in both it 
is marked by occasional policy reversals and setbacks. However, it has been two decades 
since reforms began in China and over ten years since India launched its broad-based 
economic reforms. At this juncture, it is useful to have the quantitative measure of 
                                                 
2 Kathleen Mullen and Ashok Gulati are responsible for the initial research on India￿s PSEs. The basic 
research on China￿s PSEs was undertaken by Dongsheng Sun (2003). See also Sun, Diao, Mullen and 
Gualti (2003). These papers are part of a larger study of protection and disprotection of agriculture in 
developing countries. A full paper on India is scheduled, along with papers on several other countries 
individually. Mullen et al. (2004) provides a synopsis of the discussion material and analysis presented 
herein. 3 
agricultural protection from PSEs to evaluate the current level of protection (or 
disprotection) that exists for major agricultural commodities. Such measures, while 
subject to limitations, inform the debate on how to proceed with agricultural reforms 
from a domestic policymaking perspective and from the standpoint of international trade 
negotiations currently ongoing in the WTO Doha Development Round.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we first briefly 
compare the agricultural reform processes in India and China in order to provide a 
context for interpreting the PSEs. Next we lay out the basic PSE methodology and note 
critical measurement and conceptual aspects for applications to developing countries. We 
then apply the methodology to the selected commodities in India and China, paying 
particular attention to data limitations and their implications. Our results demonstrate that 
accounting for factors such as internal transport costs and marketing margins can have a 
large impact on the resulting product-specific PSEs and that observed trade status is not 
always an appropriate indicator of the relevant price in the absence of policy intervention. 
We present empirical estimates of support given by the PSEs in the context of how well 
the indicators describe the policy scenarios that have prevailed for each commodity. We 
also present estimates of total support or disprotection of agriculture (total PSEs) in India 
and China. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results and 
directions for future research.  
 
2.  THE REFORM PROCESS AND CURRENT POLICY SETTING IN INDIA 
AND CHINA 
 
There were many similarities in the domestic market and foreign trade policies 
prior to reform in India and China. The policies were based on a fundamental philosophy 
that markets could not be trusted in agriculture. As in many other developing countries 
with smallholder dominated agricultural sectors and poorly developed market 
infrastructure and institutions, government interventions instead of the market were 4 
pursued to achieve the twin goals of self-sufficiency and low food prices for consumers. 
While similarities in both countries￿ agricultural trade policies should not be overstated, a 
few basic similarities are as follows: 
(1)  Both countries pursued a series of closed economy policies and formed an 
autarkic environment for agriculture. Self-sufficiency was believed to be the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the nation’s food security (Srinivasan, 1994; 
Lin, 1994). 
(2)  Both countries extremely restricted the market￿s role in balancing supply and 
demand of agricultural products. In India, a set of complicated agricultural price, 
procurement, distribution, storage and subsidy (mainly on inputs) policies were 
employed. The initial government interventions in the market in China were quite 
similar to those the Indian government pursued; the market-mistrust, combined 
with Communist orthodoxy, resulted in the entire economy being almost fully 
planned by the government. 
(3)  In both countries, agricultural trade policies served as complementary instruments 
to make the economy effectively closed. Even though exports of some agricultural 
products had to be encouraged in order for foreign exchange earning to cover 
imports of capital equipment and industrial intermediates, trade in major 
agricultural products, often called strategic commodities, was highly restricted. 
(4)  India and China have utilized many trade policy instruments, such as import 
tariffs, quantitative restrictions, import and export licensing, and marketing 
restrictions to limit foreign trade in agriculture, and all these policies had to be 
implemented by the state trading enterprises (STEs), which were often an 
extension of the government bureaucratic system. 
While the policies the Indian government pursued reflected heavy central planning in 
their features, the country was fundamentally a market economy, both in terms of clearly 5 
defined private property rights and the policymaking process. In China, a planned 
economy built on socialist principles, there was a lack of basic market institutions, 
farmers had no fundamental rights, and private traders simply did not exist. 
2.1  INDIA￿S REFORM PROCESS 
India￿s agricultural policy has long been characterized by domestic and border 
interventions aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production and providing food 
to consumers at reasonable prices. To achieve these goals the Government of India (GOI) 
has implemented myriad policies including tariffs and non-tariff barriers, quantitative 
restrictions, import licensing, domestic price and marketing controls, and export 
restrictions. These policies have been applied with a view to reconcile domestic demand 
and supply, export potential, and the balance-of-payment situation (Gulati and Hoda, 
2003). When India embarked on its broad-based macroeconomic reforms in 1991, this 
was largely restricted to the non-agricultural sector. It was not until later in the decade 
that direct reforms in agriculture started to take hold. With the signing of the URAA in 
1994, some adjustments were made. In the initial years, even this was limited, although a 
series of steps have been taken since 1994 to gradually open up the agricultural sector. 
Most notable is the abolition of quantitative import restrictions completed in 2001. 
However, these quantitative restrictions were in many cases replaced by high bound and 
applied tariff rates, as it was feared that surges of imports would harm domestic 
producers.  
Following the 1991 economic reforms, India progressively trimmed the list of 
products that were restricted to import by STEs. Imports of a few critical commodities 
continue to be controlled by STEs including copra and coconut oil (State Trading 
Corporation) and some cereals (Food Corporation of India (FCI)). Exports of most 
agricultural commodities were also subject to burdensome government restrictions. 
Together with import restrictions, high tariffs and overvalued exchange rates, there was a 
considerable anti-export bias in the economy prior to reforms (Gulati and Hoda, 2003). 6 
Exports of a number of agricultural products were subject to strict controls, and after the 
1991 reforms the number of products subject to quantitative export controls has been 
progressively reduced. After 2002, export restrictions apply only to onions and basmati 
rice (Hoda and Sekhar, 2003).  
India￿s domestic agricultural policies have also only been partially affected by the 
economic reforms of 1991. Restrictions on movement, stocking and licensing 
requirements have recently been abolished and futures markets, which had been banned, 
are now permitted. But basic staples in India continue to be subject to Minimum Support 
Prices (MSPs), the stated objectives of which are to ensure remunerative prices to the 
farmers, reduce the risk that farmers face, promote agricultural diversification, and ensure 
food security for the poor (Vyas, 2003). Large increases in the MSPs for wheat and rice 
in recent years have led to a massive accumulation of food grain stocks, reaching 63 
million tons in 2002 against a minimum buffer norm of 24 million tons. To reduce 
stocking levels, the government has expanded domestic food aid and food for work 
programs, increased open-market (including export) sales of food grains at prices much 
below acquisition cost and provided incentives for exporters. In 2000 and 2001, the 
government also reduced the ￿issue price￿ of food grains delivered through the public 
distribution system for families both above and below the poverty line and introduced the 
￿Antyodaya Anna Yojana￿ (AAY) program to distribute grain at highly subsidized prices 
to the poorest of the poor (GOI, 2003). In 2002 and 2003, the issue prices for above and 
below the poverty line families remained unchanged, though the allocation of foodgrains 
was increased for families covered under the AAY, and for families above and below 
poverty line (GOI, 2003). In the long run, however, the Government acknowledges, 
￿open-ended procurement by the FCI at a high price and disposal at a heavily subsidized 
price is not sustainable￿ (GOI, 2002b, Part A, paragraphs 27-28).  
In recent years, input subsidies have increased and now also seem to be 
financially unsustainable (Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). Some of the subsidies, e.g. the 
fertilizer subsidy, and under-pricing of power and irrigation, have also become 7 
environmentally harmful. It is often argued that a large portion of the fertilizer subsidy is 
going to support an inefficient fertilizer industry, rather than to provide farmers with low 
cost inputs. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) calculate the implicit fertilizer subsidy accruing 
to farmers is only half of the government￿s expenditures on fertilizer subsidies over the 
period 1981-82 to 1999-00 when account is taken of low pricing of gas to fertilizer 
plants. Under-pricing of power to agricultural users represents the largest input subsidy to 
the sector, though one must be cautious in interpreting these figures since agricultural 
power usage is not metered and is obtained as a residual, with perhaps as much as 40 
percent of the consumption going to non-agricultural users (Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). 
Electrical power to agriculture is offered at a very low tariff in most states, or in a few 
cases it is even free. Like fertilizer subsidies, a portion of the budgetary subsidy is 
actually used to support the inefficient supplier, in this case the State Electricity Boards 
(Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). Irrigation subsidies, charged against states￿ budgets, have 
remained a mainstay of agricultural input subsidies despite repeated attempts at reform. 
In most states, the pricing of canal waters does not cover more than 20 percent of the 
operation and maintenance costs, to say nothing of capital recovery cost (Gulati and 
Narayanan, 2003). With the rising support prices for food grains and increasing input 
subsidies, many have begun to question whether Indian agriculture has shifted from an 
￿implicitly taxed￿ to an ￿implicitly subsidized￿ sector. Indeed rising stocks of food grains 
and subsidization of exports would seem to point to positive protection levels, at least in 
the wheat and rice sectors.   
2.2  CHINA￿S REFORM PROCESS 
In China, unlike in India, reforms in agriculture began earlier and on the domestic 
front. The introduction of the now well-known Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
granted production decision-making power to the farm households and allowed farmers 
to sell surplus crops freely at market-determined prices only after they had fulfilled their 
obligations under the state order system. Early reforms centered on decollectivization and 
increasing incentives to farmers, while later reforms have attempted to gradually 8 
liberalize prices and markets (de Brauw et al., 2002). Market liberalization began with 
non-strategic crops including fruits, vegetables, fish and livestock (Huang and Rozelle, 
2002). Market reforms continued intermittently throughout the 1980s and 1990s with 
progress depending on the stability of production and food prices. The state procurement 
and distribution systems were substantially liberalized in the early 1990s following 
several years of market stability. However, when food price inflation appeared in 1994, 
the government reinstated compulsory grain procurement (Huang and Rozelle, 2002). 
The Governors￿ Grain-Bag Responsibility System (GGBRS), introduced in 1995 shifted 
the responsibility of management of grain supplies from the central government to the 
provinces and mandated that the provinces maintain an overall balance of grain supply 
and demand and use local reserves to regulate markets and stabilize prices (OECD, 
2002). Despite such periodic delays in the reform process, markets have gradually 
emerged in China￿s agricultural sector. According to Lardy (2001), the share of the 
agricultural commodities sold through markets was just 6 percent in 1978, and this share 
increased to 40 percent by 1985, 79 percent by 1995, and 83 percent by 1999.  
China￿s foreign trade reforms in general involved four aspects: lowering trade 
barriers, depreciating the exchange rate, decentralizing the trading system, and 
introducing competition into foreign trade so that prices could play a role in determining 
resource allocation (Martin, 1999). The early foreign trade reforms were mainly pushed 
by the demand induced by reform in the domestic economy, and hence, also adopted the 
dual-track approach. Such a dual-track approach included a two-tier exchange rate system 
before 1994, a two-tier foreign exchange retention system, and dual export and import 
systems. In terms of the dual export system, for example, under the 1984 reform, with the 
decentralized Foreign Trade Corporation (FTC), about 60 percent of exports were still 
under the mandatory plan made by the central government, an additional 20 percent were 
assigned as value targets to the provinces, but the remaining 20 percent were non-plan 
exports. For the mandatory export plans, the procurement prices were fixed and target 
quantities were assigned to the producing enterprises, similar to the domestic trading 
system. However, for the non-mandatory exports, procurement prices faced by FTCs 9 
were much more flexible, but were still not fully linked with international prices. 
Analogous policy adjustments were also applied to imports. However, the agency system 
under which the FTCs acted as agents of the production enterprises was much more 
prevalent for imports than for exports.  
For agricultural exports, the commodities that fell into the mandatory categories 
were those that still had production quotas, such as grains, oil crops, cotton, and other 
major industrial material export crops. Various vegetables and fruits and other small 
crops were the first group of commodities that could be freely exported through the 
FTCs, which resulted in a significant increase in agricultural exports of these products. 
Overall, China has been a net exporter of agricultural products since 1984 (China 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2002). 
In January 1994, the exchange rate was unified to the prevailing swap-market 
rate, which led to a significant depreciation of the official exchange rate of about 50 
percent. The unification of the exchange rate further stimulated China’s exports, as prices 
faced by producers significantly increased measured in the domestic currency. 
Adjustments in China￿s trade policy, including tariff reduction policies, 
significantly changed China’s agricultural export and import structure. Agricultural trade 
has moved in a direction that is more consistent with China’s comparative advantage. For 
example, calculated by Huang and Rozelle (2002), the proportion of grain exports fell to 
20 percent of total agricultural exports in the 1990s, from more than 40 percent in the 
1980s. Horticultural, animal, and aquatic products accounted for more than 80 percent of 
agricultural exports in the late 1990s. By re-grouping trade data according to factor 
intensity in production, Huang and Rozelle (2002) find that China’s net exports of land-
intensive bulk commodities, such as grains, oilseeds, and sugar crops, have fallen, while 
exports of high value and more labor-intensive commodities have risen. 
To summarize, China’s reforms have been carried out for more than two decades 
and India began its reforms 10 years ago, yet it seems that more reforms are required in 10 
both countries. Frequent policy reversals plague the reform process of both countries 
particularly on the external trade regime with intermittent bans and licenses issued on 
imports and exports of strategic commodities depending on domestic food prices, 
availability and foreign exchange concerns. In India and China various local marketing 
taxes and fees burden farmers, while at the same time in China agricultural products sold 
into the market by farmers are exempt from the value-added tax (VAT) system. At the 
wholesale level, the VAT is only assessed on traders￿ marketing margins, rather than on 
the sale price, and thus offers domestic agriculture significant protection over imports 
that are taxed on their entire value (Huang and Rozelle, 2002). Both countries have 
recently used subsidies to increase export shipments of some commodities. In India, 
wheat and rice for export have been estimated to receive sizeable subsidies on freight and 
stocking costs, almost up to 50 percent of product value (Wailes, 2003). In China, corn 
and cotton exports have been estimated to receive subsidies in 2001 in the order of 34 
percent and 10 percent, respectively (Huang and Rozelle, 2002). And as discussed above, 
increasing procurement prices for wheat and rice and rising input subsidies in India are 
putting significant pressure on the government budget. Strong growth in the non-
agricultural economy is contributing to government￿s motivation to offer subsidies to 
agriculture, as has not been possible in the past. Given the dynamic policy setting in both 
countries, an indicator of agricultural support such as the PSE is a useful yardstick to 
measure if reforms taken to date have reduced or even reversed the direction of market 
distortions.  
 
3.  PSE METHODOLOGY: DESCRIPTION AND ISSUES IN 
APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The starting point of our analysis is the methodology utilized by the OECD to 
measure PSEs in its member countries (Portugal, 2002). The first calculations of PSEs 
(then referred to as Producer Subsidy Equivalent) were undertaken by the FAO for five 
countries and five commodities over the period 1968-70 (Josling and Tangermann, 1989). 11 
This original PSE was defined as the level of per unit producer subsidy that would be 
needed to replace the actual package of farm policies employed in a certain country and 
leave farm income unchanged.
3 The PSE is based on the small country assumption (price 
taker) and on existing world prices. It is most appropriately viewed as an ex post measure 
of the gross transfers to producers based on observed output and prices, and thus it 
implicitly assumes that supply curves are perfectly inelastic.
4 A product-specific PSE can 
be expressed in monetary value per unit of output, as an aggregate monetary value for 
total national production of the given commodity, or on a percentage basis, usually 
reported as a percentage of the value of production plus budgetary support provided to 
that commodity. The product-specific PSEs can then be aggregated for a subset of 
commodities or for all of agriculture, again expressed either as a monetary value or as a 
percentage. The original PSE excluded the effects of factor market policies, of non-
agricultural policies at both the sectoral and macroeconomic levels (e.g. tariffs on fuel 
and exchange rate distortions), and of agricultural policies on inputs (e.g. feed prices in 
livestock production). In addition to the work by the FAO, by the mid 1980s, the OECD 
and USDA (1994) had also undertaken PSE studies.  
3.1   BASIC METHODOLOGY 
The OECD originally adopted a very broad definition of the PSE to include direct 
and indirect income support, research and extension expenditures, certain taxation 
benefits, costs of structural measures, capital grants and interest subsidies, and policies at 
the sub-national level. Josling and Tangermann (1989) argue that the heterogeneity of the 
included policies put strain on any assumption of relatively equal impacts on farm output 
per dollar of transfer, a result demonstrated by Dewbre et al. (2001).  
                                                 
3 A corresponding Consumer Subsidy Equivalent or Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) measures 
protection or disprotection to consumers of agricultural products.   
4 This is one of the ways in which the PSE is distinct from the economic concept of producer surplus, 
where, given a price change, production also changes, assuming the elasticity of supply is greater than zero. 
Another important difference is that the PSE is a gross measure, while producer surplus is a net concept. 
We discuss these differences briefly in section 3.3. 12 
The most recent revision of the OECD methodology took place in 1999 and was 
applied at that time to the OECD member countries.
5 The current OECD approach 
expands and refines the PSE methodology employed in the FAO and USDA studies and 
the earlier OECD studies. The OECD reports the PSE in monetary terms or as the 
percentage PSE, which at the aggregate level is a ratio of the total PSE to the value of 
total gross farm receipts measured by the value of production at domestic farmgate prices 
plus all government transfers (OECD, 2000). Within the PSE, policies are categorized 
into one of eight subcategories. Market price support (MPS) is defined as the component 
of the PSE that is an ￿indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers arising from policy measures that 
create a gap between domestic market prices and border prices of a specific commodity 
measured at the farmgate level￿ (Portugal, 2002 p. 2). It is calculated based on the 
difference between the domestic price and an equivalent world price of a commodity. The 
seven other subcategories of support are measured by budgetary outlays for various types 
of government payments that support farmers. On average for OECD countries, the total 
MPS (for all of agriculture) accounted for 63 percent of the total PSE in 2000-2002 
(OECD, 2003).  
3.1.1   Estimating Market Price Support (MPS) 
Assuming competitive markets, ex post price certainty, and a small country case 
whereby a nation￿s domestic and border policies do not affect world prices, the domestic 
farmgate price of a commodity, Pd , is compared to an adjusted reference price, Par. The 
types of adjustments made to determine Par are shown for an imported and an exported 
commodity in equations (1) and (2). 
   
                                                 
5 The OECD has also used this methodology to compute PSEs for six transition countries: Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Russia and Slovak Republic in 1986-2001 (OECD, 2002). 13 
Equations (1) and (2).  Calculation of the Adjusted Reference Price  
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Source: Adopted from Melyukhina (2002). 
Note: Qadj > 0 implies that the domestic quality is lower than the quality of the internationally traded  
          commodity. 
 
The reference price at the border, Pr , is the ￿world market￿ c.i.f. price for an 
importer or f.o.b. price for an exporter expressed in the domestic currency.
6 The 
adjustments, such as those in equations (1) and (2), are made to Pr to bring it on par with 
the domestic farmgate price. Alternatively, one can think of adjusting both Pr and Pd so 
that they are compared at the level of some market in which the international and 
domestic good would compete. For example, in the case that the country is an importer of 
the commodity, the adjustments in (1) are equivalent to adjusting international and 
domestic farmgate prices to the domestic wholesale market. Wherever the price 
                                                 
6 The c.i.f. price includes transportation and insurance costs associated with moving the good from the 
exporting country to an importing country. The f.o.b. price refers to the price of the good loaded onto the 
ship at the export port, but before international shipping. It does not include the costs of transporting the 
good from the exporting country to the importing country.   14 
comparison is assumed to take place, it is important to compare prices of products that 
are ￿like with like￿ (Portugal, 2002).    
The ideal comparison is one thing, but practical comparison for empirical work is 
quite another. Starting with Pr , if the commodity is imported the reference price might be 
measured in at least two practical alternative ways. First, it can be imputed from the f.o.b. 
price of a major exporting country, Pexporterfob, plus the international freight, Ti , and other 
international costs (including insurance and margins) of moving the commodity from the 
exporting country to the importing country, Ci , according to:   
(3)  Pr = Pexporterfob + ( Ti + Ci ) 
With perfect information, Pexporterfob , Ti , and Ci are known with certainty and 
equation (3) holds as an arbitrage condition. Alternatively, the reference price at the 
border for an imported commodity might be available as an observed c.i.f. price (pre-
tariff and pre-any other policies of the country) at its border.
7    
In the case that the country is an exporter of the commodity, there are equivalent 
reference price measures. The point of comparison in world markets between the 
country￿s export price and the international price takes place as arbitraged at the border of 
a third country importer (i.e. the c.i.f. price in that third country). Similar to (3), the 
reference price at the border of the exporting country can be imputed from the c.i.f. price 
of a major importing country, Pimportercif minus the costs associated with moving the 
commodity from the exporting country in question to the importing country according to:   
(4)  Pr = Pimportercif  - ( Ti + Ci ) 
Again, with perfect information Pimportercif , Ti , and Ci are known with certainty in 
equation (4). Alternatively, the reference price for an exported commodity can be 
                                                 
7 The importance of international and internal transport costs as factors affecting trade is demonstrated by 
the fact that for 168 out of 216 U.S. trading partners international transport costs (for all goods, not just 
agricultural goods) were larger than tariff barriers (World Bank, 2002). For developing countries, 
international freight costs of bulk commodities may as much as one-quarter of the import value, as is the 
case for India in our empirical analysis.  15 
measured from an f.o.b. price observed at the border, if such a price at which the 
country￿s product competes in world markets is available.
8  
Regardless of whether the commodity is imported or exported, the reference price 
Pr is adjusted by the costs of handling, transporting and marketing between the border 
and the wholesale market (Cp and Td1), the costs of handling, transporting, marketing and 
processing the commodity between the farm and the wholesale market (Td2 and M), and 
by any needed adjustment for differences in quality between the domestic and 
internationally produced commodity (Qadj ).
9 The price gap at the farmgate level, ∆P, then 
is a monetary measure of market price support per unit of output:  
(5)  ∆P = Pd - Par 
Ideally, ∆P captures the differences induced by visible and invisible policy interventions 
between Pd and Par. Expressed in percentage terms relative to the reference price (∆P/ 
Par), the price gap is a traditional nominal rate of protection (NRP), or as we refer to it 
later, the ￿%MPS.￿ 
Together with the effects of policies, estimated price gaps will reflect any 
measurement errors in the price comparison adjustments. For Pr , these arise from 
empirical measures of Pexporterfob , Pimportercif , and/or (Ti + Ci ) as relevant to the commodity 
under consideration. In addition, there are four types of potential measurement errors that 
arise in assessing the within-country adjustments: 
1.  in the costs from port to domestic wholesale markets                          
(measurement error in (Cp + Td1 )); 
                                                 
8 Unlike an import, where the appropriate reference price excludes any policies of the country under study, 
for an export the appropriate reference price is the price offered by the country inclusive of any export 
subsidies or taxes.  
9 Again, these cost adjustments can be substantial. Inefficient internal transport systems, cumbersome 
certification requirements, poorly integrated inter-modal transport systems and lack of competition in 
transport services markets in developing countries represent real barriers to trade. For example, according 
to a World Bank (2002) study, in China truck rates for moving a container 500 kilometers inland are 
estimated to be three times more costly and take five times longer than they would in the U.S. or Europe. 16 
2.  in the cost from farmgate to wholesale markets (measurement error in         
(Td2 + M )); 
3.  in the levels of farmgate prices (measurement error in Pd ); and  
4.  in the comparability of the domestic and internationally produced goods in 
terms of quality (measurement error in Qadj ). 
The difficulties in assessing market price gaps are likely to be particularly 
important in developing countries compared to developed countries for a number of 
reasons. First, the developing countries are even more likely than the OECD countries to 
utilize border policies or commodity price support programs backed up by market 
interventions and government stockholding. These are policies whose effects are 
measured in an MPS. Second, with less well-developed infrastructure, various costs 
associated with adjusting the reference price are likely to have larger magnitudes in 
developing countries, so taking them into account (or not) will have a larger effect on the 
estimated MPS and its interpretation. Real transportation costs could be high, for 
example, either because of poor roads (a public investment issue) or an aged and high-
cost fleet of trucks (a private investment issue). Third, developing countries may be more 
likely than developed countries to switch from importer to exporter of a commodity 
across years, and the relevant reference price adjustments for internal costs can differ 
depending on the circumstances for a given period. Fourth, even if competitive market 
forces are functioning relatively well in the handling, transportation, processing and 
marketing sectors, acquiring the requisite data on various costs may be particularly 
resource intensive (beyond plausible research budgets) or consistent data over a range of 
years may simply not exist.  
The price gap in developing countries, and difficulties in assessing its policy 
component, may also be affected by imperfect competition in the handling, 
transportation, processing or marketing sectors. At an extreme, a private (or state 
operated) monopoly in one or more of these sectors could either have excessive costs, 
extract excess profits, and/or be the instrument for implementation of such policies as 17 
import restrictions or an export subsidy. Each would affect the observed price gap, but 
with different implications. For example, both inefficiencies in processing and hidden 
export taxes would push the observed farmgate price below the reference price, but it 
might be impossible to separate the two effects with their different policy implications. 
By contrast, in the competitive markets assumed (perhaps more reasonably) to prevail in 
developed countries when PSEs are calculated, the MPS would come closer to capturing 
only the effects of the export policy. 
Since a substantial amount of data is required to calculate the price gaps, 
attempting to assess market price support in a developing country context requires 
making judgements on how to reduce the measurement error given available data and 
research resources. For the reference price, if Ti , and Ci have to be estimated to impute Pr 
a degree of error may be introduced by the cost measurements. If instead Pr is assessed 
from observed prices at the country￿s border, Ti and Ci do not have to be estimated, but 
the issue of quality adjustment may be more severe. A different source of measurement 
error would be introduced, for example, if the qualities of the commodity imported and 
the domestic commodity differ more than for a corresponding quality of the product 
traded internationally but not imported by this particular country.  
The importance of measurement error related to various within-country 
adjustments to the reference price will vary among situations. For some commodities, 
there is complex processing, such as conversion of sugarcane to raw or refined sugar, so a 
substantial determinant of the MPS will be associated with adjustments to the reference 
price for these processing costs. In such cases, a comparison might be made, for 
simplicity, between the reference price of the processed commodity adjusted to the 
wholesale level and the domestic price of that processed commodity at the wholesale 
level. Such a comparison would not separate protection (or disprotection) between 18 
domestic farmers and processors. This could be an important distinction, especially if 
processing is inefficient or non-competitive.
10 
Another example where the relative importance of various adjustments to the 
reference price may differ is based, for an imported commodity, on the proximity of 
domestic consumers to the port of entry versus domestic production regions. To give an 
extreme example, the port could be the national capital and population center, while 
domestic production takes place far in the hinterland. In this case, farm to wholesale 
marketing costs are likely to be the more important adjustment. Conversely, perhaps 
another country is landlocked and far from port, while domestic production lies in 
eyesight of capital buildings. Adjustments from the observed reference price of imports 
to the domestic wholesale market would be most important in this case.  
When reliable data series on all of the adjustment factors are not readily available, 
one approach the OECD has applied to estimating market price gaps has been to make an 
assumption that certain ￿mark-ups￿ to the reference price are approximately cancelled out 
by certain ￿mark-downs.￿ Under this assumption, a net correction can be made only for 
those adjustments that don￿t cancel out. Melyukhina (2002), for example, made the 
following reference price assumptions to simplify the calculation of the price gap in the 
case of non-OECD member transition economies: 
(6)  P = (Pw + (Ti + Td1) ￿ (Td2 + Qadj ) ￿ M )  
where Pw = EU f.o.b. export price. Equation (6) includes adjustments similar to (1) for an 
imported commodity. Melyukhina then assumes that: 
                                                 
10 For example, in the case of sugar, the MPS is often measured by the price gap between the domestic 
wholesale and international price of refined sugar.  The price gap is then converted to equivalents at the 
farmgate level using appropriate technical coefficients (Cahill and Legg, 1990).  Agricultural processors, in 
this case sugar millers, are assumed to be operating under perfect competition.  Doyon et al. (2001) discuss 
the case when the sugar millers have market power. They point out that sugar millers with market power 
may increase the domestic wholesale price of sugar without increasing the price paid to farmers for 
sugarcane.  In this event, the calculated MPS would increase without farmers actually receiving any 
benefits. 19 
(7) (Ti + Td1) ￿ (Td2 + Qadj ) ≈ 0 
so that:  
(8)  ∆P = Pd ￿ ( Pw ￿ M )  
By this formulation the price gap equation reduces to the difference between an 
approximation to the domestic wholesale price (farmgate price plus marketing costs 
between the farm and wholesale market) and the world f.o.b. export price (for the EU in 
this case). Compared to (6), equation (8) looks more like partial adjustments for an 
exported commodity.
11 Melyukhina argues that while this procedure introduces an 
estimation error, in the absence of sufficient data, it seems to be pragmatic (p. 11). Yet in 
our formulation, where 1) international adjustments are likely to be determined by 
different economic forces and measured perhaps more accurately than domestic 
adjustments, 2) adjustments for the imported commodity could well differ from those for 
the domestic commodity, and 3) differences in quality might be important, it seems odd 
to assume the approximation in (7). At a minimum, such approximation would seem to 
require some empirical confirmation. 
3.1.2   Budgetary  Payments 
According to the OECD approach, budgetary payments are divided into seven 
subcategories depending on the conditions of eligibility on which transfers are made to 
farmers: those based on 1) output; 2) area planted/animal numbers; 3) historical 
entitlements; 4) input use; 5) input constraints; 6) overall farming income; and 7) 
miscellaneous payments. With the increased use of support payments in developed 
countries that are at least partially decoupled from current production of any particular 
crop, the OECD is in the process of redefining if and how different program payments 
should be allocated to individual commodities (OECD, 2003). 
                                                 
11 Brooks and Melyukhina (2003) explore the issue of price transmission in the case of Russian crop 
markets and point out that even in perfectly adjusting markets, policy or world price changes may not be 
fully passed through.  This work has obvious implications for the degree of price transmission in the 
agricultural sector in developing countries and for measuring the effects of policy reform in general. 20 
Patterns and levels of budgetary expenditures on agricultural support by 
developing countries are likely to differ substantially from those of wealthier OECD 
countries. In transition (and developing) economies, particular care must be taken to 
include all budgetary assistance, even that which is not associated with direct payments to 
farmers (Melyukhina, 2002). Preferential prices for inputs such as electricity, fertilizer, 
irrigation and transportation may also be more important in developing than developed 
countries. These subsidies would be categorized as budgetary payments, though subsidies 
on tradable inputs at the farmgate level may be better measured through a price gap 
method analogous to the calculation of MPS for output commodities, as Gulati and 
Narayanan (2003) have demonstrated.  
3.1.3   Calculating PSEs 
The total PSE expressed in nominal terms for all agricultural producers is the sum 
of a total of MPS, which is the price gap per unit of each output multiplied by the 
quantity of output, summed over all outputs included in the analysis, and aggregate 
budgetary transfers. Data on the aggregate budgetary transfers to producers are often 
more readily available than budgetary transfers by commodity. The calculation of total 
MPS is more problematic. According to the OECD approach calculation of total MPS 
consists of three steps. First, a nominal value of MPSj is estimated for each individual 
product ￿j￿ included in the analysis, the set of which is known as the ￿MPS 
commodities.￿ For OECD member countries, these products typically include wheat, 
maize, other grains, oilseeds, sugar, milk, beef and veal, pigmeat, poultry, and eggs. 
OECD member countries have agreed that the set of MPS commodities should cover at 
least 70 percent of total value of agricultural production (Portugal, 2002). 
The second step is to sum the product-specific MPSj into an aggregate MPS for 
the covered commodities. For N commodities this yields: 
(9)  MPSc = ∑ MPSj ;  j = 1￿N   21 
One method to estimate the nominal PSE for a country (not used by OECD) is to 
include only the market price support derived for covered commodities (MPSc) in the 
calculation: 
(10)  PSEc = MPSc + BP 
where BP is the total budgetary payments to producers. In percentage terms (of total 
transfers to producers, from MPSc and BP, to gross farm receipts measured by the value 
of production at producer prices plus budgetary payments), this version of the PSE is: 









BP MPSc  
where VP is the total value of agricultural production at domestic producer prices.  
In the OECD approach, a third step is made to calculate the PSE. The MPSc for 
covered commodities is ￿scaled up￿ to all products based on the share (k) of the covered 
commodities in the total value of production. Algebraically, the final step or ￿MPS 
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where MPS is the estimated total market price support. With the scaling up, the OECD 
￿Total PSE￿ is calculated as: 
(13)  PSE = MPS + BP 
The percentage PSE is:  












Using the first approach of not scaling up (equations 10 and 11), commodities not 
covered are assumed to receive no market price support, while in the scaling-up step (12) 22 
commodities not included in the analysis are assumed to have market price support equal 
to an average of the MPS among covered commodities. Either approximation introduces 
error, and any error is relatively more or less important as the MPS component of the 
PSE increases relative to the budget payment component. The error introduced can be 
minimized by including as many products as possible in the set of covered commodities 
(Melyukhina, 2002). But for developing countries, feasible coverage is likely to be less 
than for the OECD countries, and the assumption imposed by scaling up may be 
unrealistic if support is concentrated among those commodities included in the analysis. 
3.1.4   Producer Support as a Percentage of World Market Value 
The above measures of percentage PSE utilize the value of production at domestic 
prices plus budget payments as the denominator. This is essentially a ￿subsidy counter￿s￿ 
approach. An alternative (￿trade economist￿s￿) approach (denominator) is to express 
support received by farmers as a percentage of the value of their output at farmgate-
equivalent international prices. This is consistent conceptually with measuring nominal 
protection or %MPS. For the total PSE, this alternative measure is: 












where VP* is the total value of agricultural production at international prices. For one 
thing, this calculation avoids the systematic error of giving activities with higher 
protection greater weight in the denominator (Pursell and Gupta, 1996). 
Since data on the value of total agricultural production at world prices is not 
available, the denominator in equation (15) has to be approximated. One approach is 
simply to subtract the MPSc for the covered commodities from VP. Alternatively, VP* 
can be approximated by scaling up the value of production of the covered commodities at 
world prices by the same ￿k￿ as above.  23 
3.1.5   Product-Specific PSEs 
The calculation of a product-specific PSEj, where again ￿j￿ denotes a specific 
commodity, requires that budgetary payments be allocated across commodities to 
determine the budgetary support for a given product, BPj. If such payments are reported 
by commodities, the procedure is straightforward. However, for payments such as input 
subsidies or general subsidies such as tax or capital grants, allocation across commodities 
can be more complicated. In this case, the payments are often assumed to be distributed 
on the basis of each commodity￿s share in total value of agricultural production 
(Melyukhina, 2002). Other criteria, such as the share of acreage also provide plausible 
approximations, although each may introduce a measurement error. Silvis and van der 
Hamsvoort (1996) note that the method in which program payments are allocated across 
commodities is not always clear. 
Once budgetary payments are allocated among commodities, the product-specific 
PSEj is the sum of the nominal MPSj and budgetary support for that commodity. The 
product-specific PSEj can also be expressed on a percentage basis two ways, either using 
the proportion of gross farm income that is a result of policy measures (VPj + BPj ) as the 
denominator or using the value of output at farmgate-equivalent international prices, 
VPj*. Production is valued at international prices in the %MPSj and the trade economist￿s 
%PSEj. Since the PSEj includes the market price support and budget payments, the ￿trade 
economist￿s￿ product-specific %PSEj will always be at least as high or higher than the 
%MPSj. Quite different numerical representation of the policy effects can arise with the 
￿subsidy counter￿s￿ %PSEj because the denominator for this measure is the value of farm 
output at domestic prices plus budget payments. 
3.1.6 Additional  Measurement  Issues 
Beyond the mechanics of calculating PSEs, as described above, numerous other 
computational concerns arise (for simplicity, we don￿t carry forward the specific-24 
commodity and covered commodities subscripts ￿j￿ and ￿c￿ unless needed for clarity). 
Additional measurement issues particularly relevant in calculating PSEs in developing 
countries include: 1) the exchange rate, 2) the need for regional-level analysis, 3) the use 
of post-harvest or annual average prices, and 4) the choice between marketable surplus or 
total production.  
Calculating reference prices requires the use of an exchange rate. Most PSE 
studies utilize the nominal exchange rate prevailing each year. Krueger, Schiff, and 
ValdØs (1992), in contrast, fully accounted for the effects of exchange rate misalignment 
through a decomposition method in their seminal analysis of agricultural pricing policies 
in developing countries. Harley (1996) also used decomposition analysis to provide a 
measurement of the contribution of annual variation in different PSE components, 
including the exchange rate, to the overall annual PSE change. Others have used the 
adjusted (shadow) exchange rates, mostly based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), in 
PSE calculations. For example, Liefert, et al. (1996) show that the 1994 PSE estimates 
for Russia change from negative to positive if a PPP exchange rate is used instead of a 
nominal one. Doyon et al. (2001) contend that in the context of comparing support levels 
across countries, PPP adjustments would provide a better conversion factor than nominal 
exchange rates. More generally, modern macroeconomic models could be used to 
estimate equilibrium exchange rates and the effects of any exchange rate misalignment on 
PSEs could be evaluated. Exchange rate adjustments can be particularly important for 
developing countries where exchange rate disequilibrium can be large and persistent.    
A second issue of particular importance in measuring PSEs in large developing 
countries is the need for regional-level analysis where there are substantial differences in 
the within-country adjustments to the reference price or where support policies differ 
across states or provinces. In these large developing countries, it is possible that 
producers in some regions could be benefiting from policy interventions, while in other 25 
regions they could be losing.
12 If internal markets are well integrated, observed 
differences in regional prices presumably result from differences in real costs, rather than 
being the result of policy interventions. Yet different adjustments for internal transport 
and marketing costs could lead to different PSEs by region when, for example, pan-
territorial farmgate price support is provided by the government. If there are movement 
restrictions, state-level variations in minimum support prices, or other policies that vary 
at the sub-national level, as can be the case in large developing countries, PSEs may 
again differ markedly by region.  
One useful distinction when state-level analysis is necessary for a particular 
commodity is to separate states in a country that are ￿net surplus￿ producers of that 
commodity from those states that are also important producers of the commodity but are 
￿net deficit￿ regions. The deficit regions both produce and must purchase the commodity 
from other states or internationally in order to meet regional demand. In these states, the 
relevant reference price may vary slightly from that in equation (1). Gulati et al., 1990, 
and Pursell and Gupta, 1996, suggest that, assuming the commodity is an import, the 
domestic price in the deficit states should be compared with the lower of the (i) observed 
border price plus port charges plus transportation, handling and marketing costs from the 
border to the deficit region, or (ii) the adjusted reference price for a nearby surplus region 
given by equation (1) plus the transportation, handling and marketing costs from the 
surplus region to the deficit region. Pursell and Gupta (1996) find that in the case of 
wheat in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India, the latter adjustment gives the lower price, 
meaning that without trade or price interventions farmers in the deficit region would have 
to compete with domestic wheat from the surplus region. This adjusted reference price 
compared to the state-level domestic farmgate price gives a measure of the degree of 
protection (or disprotection) for farmers in the deficit region. 
                                                 
12 The same could be true among regions in a developed country, but in developed country PSE 
computation it is usually assumed that there is one domestic and import (or export) adjusted reference price 
for each commodity. 26 
The choice of annual (calendar year, crop year or fiscal year) or average harvest 
season prices can also affect the results, particularly in developing countries. The OECD 
(2003) uses annual average prices in the PSEs it computes for its member countries. 
Pursell and Gupta (1996), in contrast, use average prices during the period in which the 
bulk of the specific commodity is harvested to calculate nominal protection coefficients 
(NPCs) for Indian agriculture. They argue that annual average prices capture the storage 
costs of traders in addition to the prices received by farmers. In many cases, due to capital 
market inefficiencies and limited on-farm storage facilities, smallholder farmers in 
developing countries sell their products immediately after harvest. Under these 
circumstances, it may be more appropriate to use harvest season prices rather than annual 
average prices, keeping in mind that both the time of the year and duration of the harvest 
season is commodity- and region-specific.  
Several authors have suggested that agricultural support indicators for developing 
countries be measured based on the quantity of marketable surplus rather than on the 
entire quantity produced, since a large portion of the output produced by smallholder 
farmers is consumed on the farm (Sun, 2003; Gulati and Hoda, 2003). However, in a 
household model framework, each producer maximizes utility by selling a portion of his 
or her output and allocating the rest to home consumption. This assumes that the 
producer values all production at the market price. In this case, PSEs should be computed 
based on total production valued at producer prices rather than on marketed surplus, as 
the OECD has done for the transition economies (Melyukhina, 2002).
13      
                                                 
13 The use of official value of production for the non-OECD member countries (transition economies) was 
viewed as problematic because on-farm consumption was valued at shadow prices that differ significantly 
from market prices (Melyukhina, 2002).   
 27 
3.2   MODIFIED PROCEDURE TO ACCOUNT FOR DOMESTIC MARKET-
CLEARING PRICES 
 
Beyond the practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary data to compute PSEs, 
as described above, there is another factor that may be particularly relevant to the 
measurement and interpretation of PSEs for developing countries. In some instances, the 
presence of policy distortions can alter a commodity￿s trade status. This is particularly the 
case for countries that are near self-sufficiency in a particular commodity, have producer 
and/or consumer price controls in effect, and are large or landlocked and therefore have 
relatively high internal or external transport costs (Byerlee and Morris, 1993). These 
conditions describe the situation for cereals in many developing countries. Byerlee and 
Morris (1993) contend that under these circumstances agricultural protection indicators 
computed by the conventional methods of comparing the domestic price to an import or 
export adjusted reference price can lead to an incorrect estimate of the level and even the 
direction of protection. They suggest that a corrected protection measure be calculated 
based on the market-clearing equilibrium price as the ￿adjusted reference price￿ rather 
than the import or export price. For example, Pakistan was more than 85 percent self-
sufficient in wheat during 1985-90, had a controlled producer price slightly above the 
export price and well below the import price, and was a net importer of wheat. 
Conventional measures of support showed the domestic price as much as 40 percent 
lower than the adjusted reference import price. But Byerlee and Morris (1993) assert that 
if controls were removed the price would increase only to a domestic market-clearing 
equilibrium price, below the import price level. Using an estimated domestic equilibrium 
price instead of the adjusted import price, they calculated that wheat prices would 
increase only 10 percent if the price controls were removed.  
World price fluctuations, changes in the government intervention price levels, and 
domestic supply and demand shocks are all factors that affect whether a country will be 
importing or exporting, or, alternatively depleting or accumulating existing stocks. As 28 
Byerlee and Morris (1993) point out, the likelihood that any of these factors will result in 
a change in the trade status (or direction of stock depletion or accumulation) of a country 
is greater if the country is near self-sufficiency in a particular commodity and has 
relatively high internal or external transport costs, so that there is a wide gap between the 
adjusted reference price for imports and the adjusted reference price for exports.  
Following Byerlee and Morris (1993), we can explore when the MPS as defined 
by Portugal (2002) and based on current trade status is an appropriate measure and when 
a Byerlee-Morris comparison with the market-clearing domestic price is appropriate in 
computing the MPS components of PSEs. Because there are many factors influencing the 
current direction of trade, net trade status may not be the best determinant of which 
adjusted reference price to use. In cases where the direction of net trade changes when the 
policy interventions are removed, the ￿conventional￿ MPS based on observed trade does 
not unambiguously answer the question of what is the level of protection or disprotection 
with respect to the adjusted reference price level that would be relevant in the absence of 
the policy.  
Instead of relying on the current direction of trade to dictate which adjusted 
reference price should be used, a more systematic approach can be followed to select the 
appropriate adjusted reference price. From here on, for clarity, the adjusted reference 
price for exports will be denoted Pe and for imports Pm. In order to know which price will 
be relevant when the policy intervention is removed, one must know the relationships 
among the autarky equilibrium price, P
*, and the adjusted reference prices Pm and Pe. 
Because of international and domestic cost adjustments, it is always the case that Pm> Pe. 
Then: 
(a) if P
*>Pm, then Pm is the relevant Par 
(16)   (b)  if Pe>P
*, then Pe is the relevant Par  
(c) if Pm>P
*>Pe, then P
* is the relevant Par 29 
Depending on whether Pd is greater than, less than or equal to the relevant 
adjusted reference price, one can determine the level of protection or disprotection 
relative to the price level that would exist in the absence of the policy interventions.  
In this analysis, we maintain the assumptions of a small country model and of 
fixed supply (i.e. perfectly inelastic supply curves). We assume further a downward 
sloping demand curve inclusive of private stockholding decisions. For simplicity we also 
assume the consumer price is equal to the government-fixed producer price of Pd, though 
if appropriate, this assumption could be relaxed. In each of the three cases (a) ￿ (c) above, 
there are four scenarios that can be distinguished based on the relationships among Pd, P
*, 
Pm and Pe.
14 In cases (a) and (b), there are scenarios where net trade retains the same 
direction and where its direction changes when the policy interventions are removed.    
Starting with case (16a) where P
*>Pm, Figure 1a shows four scenarios where Pd 
would be equal to Pm under free trade, and thus Pm is the relevant adjusted reference price 
for calculating MPS with the policies in place. In the first and second scenarios, Pd is held 
relatively low, with P
*>Pm>Pe>P1 and P
*>Pm>P2>Pe, respectively. In both of these 
scenarios, the commodity is imported (or government intervention stocks are being 
reduced), and farmers are disprotected relative to Pm. In these scenarios, the adjusted 
reference price based on current net trade, and based on the relevant price in the absence 
of the policy interventions are the same. Under free trade the domestic price would 
increase to Pm, with domestic demand and imports and decreasing.  
In the third scenario in Figure 1a, P
*>P3>Pm. In this scenario, the commodity is 
imported (or government stocks are being reduced), but the domestic price is greater than 
Pm so farmers are now protected, for example by a tariff. The adjusted reference price 
based on current net trade, and based on net trade in the absence of the policy 
interventions are again the same in this scenario.  
                                                 
14 Actually, there are seven distinct scenarios, but for simplicity we are ignoring the cases where Pd=Pm, 
Pd=Pe, and Pd=P
*. 30 
In the fourth scenario, the domestic price is set even higher, with P4>P
*>Pm. In 
this scenario, the commodity is exported or government intervention stocks are 
accumulated under policies that hold the domestic price above the autarky price. 
However, under free trade, the domestic price would fall to Pm and the commodity would 
be imported. For P4>P
*, the conventional MPS based on the adjusted reference price Pe 
corresponding to the current trade status would overestimate the level of protection since 
Pm>Pe. Comparing P4 and Pe would provide an estimate of the level of per unit subsidy 
needed to export the commodity, but not of the OECD MPS definition of the gross 
transfers to producers from taxpayers and consumers.
15  
In case (16b), Pe>P
*, and Pe is the relevant adjusted reference price. The four 
scenarios shown in Figure 1b for this case are symmetrical to those for (16a). In the first 
scenario in Figure 1b, Pe >P
*>P1 and the commodity is currently disprotected and 
imported. In this scenario, because the world price is higher than in Figure 1a, if the 
policy interventions were removed, the domestic price would increase to Pe and the 
commodity would be exported. In the second scenario, Pe>P￿2>P
*. The commodity is 
again disprotected but is exported. Under free trade the price would increase to Pe. In the 
third and fourth scenarios, Pm>P￿3>Pe and P4>Pm, respectively. The commodity is 
protected relative to Pe and is exported under these two scenarios. If the policy 
intervention were removed, the domestic price would fall to Pe. 
To summarize, in Figure 1a, at P1, P2 and P3 the commodity is imported and at P4 
the commodity is exported. At P1 and P2, the commodity is disprotected relative to Pm, 
and at P3 and P4, the commodity is protected relative to Pm. In each scenario, if the policy 
interventions were removed, the domestic price would equal Pm because P
*>Pm. The 
country would import or draw down its intervention stock levels. In Figure 1b, at P4, P￿3 
and P￿2 the commodity is exported and at P1 it is imported. At P4 and P3, the commodity 
                                                 
15 One way to capture both the gross transfers from taxpayers (the export subsidy component) and the 
gross transfers from consumers (due to the higher domestic price relative to the price that would exist 
without the policy in place) is to sum P4-Pe multiplied by the quantity exported and P4-Pm, multiplied by 
the quantity of domestic consumption, the transfer from consumers.  
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is protected relative to Pe and at P2 and P1, the commodity is disprotected relative to Pe. 
In each of these scenarios, the domestic price would go to Pe because Pe>P
*.      
There is a third case (16c) to consider, as shown in Figure 1c. In this case 
Pm>P
*>Pe and P
* is the relevant adjusted reference price. The conventional MPS 
definition does not seem to allow for cases where the relevant adjusted reference price 
would be the autarky price, P
*. However, if the gap between Pm and Pe is large, which is 
likely for some developing countries where internal and external transport and handling 
costs are high, the autarky price could fall between Pm and Pe, as was demonstrated 
empirically for wheat in Pakistan by Byerlee and Morris (1993). Regardless of whether 
the country is currently using policy interventions that are disprotecting producers 
relative to P
*,
 as at P1, or the country is currently protecting producers relative to P
*, as at 
P4, when the policy interventions are removed, the domestic price will go to P
* and the 
country will be self-sufficient. The commodity will be non-traded if the policy 
interventions are removed because Pm is ￿too high￿ relative to Pd for imports to be 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using the scenarios in the three cases above, we can describe the circumstances 
under which the conventional MPS will be different than the ￿modified￿ procedure of 
selecting a relevant adjusted reference price based on the relationship among Pd, P
*, Pm 
and Pe and when the two results are the same. If the commodity is imported, for the 
conventional MPS the domestic price is compared to Pm. Thus, at P1, P2, P3 in Figure 1, 
the conventional MPS would be given by a comparison of the domestic price and Pm. 
However, as shown for P1, the appropriate comparison may be Pm, Pe or P
*, depending 
on whether P
* is above, below, or between Pm and Pe. Generalizing, for an imported 
commodity that is disprotected relative to Pm, the conventional MPS may not be an 
appropriate measure of the gross transfers to producers resulting from support policies. In 
order to differentiate these cases, one must compute P
* and compare it to Pm and Pe. 
However, if the commodity is imported and observed to be protected, for example at 
P3>Pm in Figure 1a, then the appropriate MPS is unambiguously given by comparing the 
domestic price to Pm. In this scenario, one would not have to compute P
* to obtain this 
result.  
If the commodity is exported, as at P￿2, P￿3 and P4 in Figure 1, the conventional 
MPS is based on a comparison of the domestic price and Pe. Yet, at P4 for example, Pm, 
Pe or P
* may be the relevant adjusted reference price, depending on whether P
* is above, 
below, or between Pm and Pe. Generalizing, for commodities that are exported and 
protected relative to Pe, the conventional MPS may not be an appropriate measure of the 
gross transfers to producers required to keep farm income constant when the policies are 
removed. In order to differentiate these situations, one must compute P
*. But here, if the 
commodity is exported and observed to be disprotected, for example at P￿2 in Figure 1b, 
then the appropriate MPS is unambiguously given by comparing the domestic price to Pe. 
Again, one would not have to compute P
* to obtain this result.  
To review, following Byerlee and Morris (1993), a comparison of the autarky 
price to the computed import and export adjusted reference prices can be used to identify 
the relevant adjusted reference price. In doing so, the MPS concept can be applied to 34 
situations where a commodity would be non-traded if the existing policy interventions 
were removed, a situation the conventional MPS does not accommodate. We have 
demonstrated herein that unless a commodity is imported and protected relative to Pm or 
exported and disprotected relative to Pe, the MPS based on current trade status can be 
misleading.   
3.3  ECONOMIC CRITIQUES OF THE PSE 
While the preceding discussion focuses on adjustments relevant to PSE largely 
within the framework laid out by the OECD (Portugal, 2002), it is also useful before 
proceeding to our empirical analysis to summarize a few of the broader conceptual 
critiques that have arisen over the derivation and interpretation of PSEs. The concerns 
broadly fall into two categories, those related to the assumptions of the PSE concept and 
those related to its interpretation.  
Silvis and van der Hamsvoort (1996) argue that the assumption that the domestic 
price and quantity and international prices are independent (that all countries are small 
and therefore cannot individually affect world prices) is unrealistic. On this basis alone, 
PSEs may overestimate agricultural support in OECD or other countries because they are 
based on current world prices instead of long-term equilibrium (free trade) prices. 
Although long-term equilibrium prices are difficult to estimate, they are expected to be 
higher than current world prices that are depressed by subsidies, so using equilibrium 
prices would result in a PSE that is smaller than the OECD￿s estimates for its member 
countries (Oskam and Meester, 2003). For developing countries, the subsidies and border 
protection of OECD countries with protected agriculture drive down world prices, 
resulting in disprotection to their farmers being implicit in the adjusted reference price 
from world markets. Beierle and Diaz-Bonilla (2003) review numerous studies of these 
price effects and conclude that ￿a common estimate of the extent to which OECD policies 
depress prices is 10 percent￿ with larger effects on commodities such as sugar, sheep 35 
meat and milk. This external effect tempers the interpretation of PSE for developing 
countries calculated on the basis of observed world prices. 
On technical grounds, the PSE implicitly assumes that domestic and 
internationally produced goods are perfect substitutes or that a quality adjustment can be 
made to make them such. This is a departure from the Armington assumption often 
employed in computable general equilibrium (CGE), and some partial equilibrium, 
models. Under the Armington assumption, similar goods from different countries are 
imperfect substitutes for which equilibrium prices will not be equal even when 
adjustments are made for arbitrage. In these models, various elasticities of substitution in 
production and consumption are assumed between domestic and traded goods. Changes 
in output quantities affect prices in the models, and effects of policy change can be 
evaluated at the resulting equilibrium prices under each scenario.  
The assumption that the price elasticity is equal to zero may be consistent with an 
ex post measurement of the gross transfers to producers, yet it cannot substitute for a 
modelling approach to measuring the price, production, consumption, trade, income or 
welfare effects of agricultural policies either ex ante or over time (Herrmann et al., 1992). 
PSEs cannot be used directly to predict the trade effects of policy changes. For example, 
the liberalization of a production quota and price guarantee policy with equivalent PSE 
measures would have very different effects on trade (Silvis and van der Hamsvoort, 
1996).
16 Herrmann et al. (1992) argue that the PSE, as an income-oriented measure, is not 
well suited to capture the trade effect of agricultural policies. Instead, they propose a 
￿trade distortion equivalent￿ based on the difference between the quantity traded with 
policy interventions in place and a hypothetical quantity traded under free trade.  
It is particularly important to realize that PSEs are not the same as producer 
surplus, though sometimes they are misinterpreted as such (Oskam and Meester, 2003). 
PSEs based on current prices and fixed quantities are neither linked with the welfare 
                                                 
16 Oskam and Meester (2003) also show that if a quota system is in place, the PSE methodology may 
underestimate its effects on producers. 36 
economic theories of producer surplus, nor are they comparable to the estimated benefits 
of agricultural liberalization derived from partial equilibrium or CGE models, when there 
is a supply response. Oskam and Meester (2003) demonstrate, for example, with a 
stylised, one-commodity, three-country model that the MPS and producer surplus not 
only differ in magnitude, but can also be of the opposite sign. Moreover, the authors 
argue that it is difficult to interpret the total PSE, because of the simple aggregation of 
market price support and budgetary expenditures whose measurement is not related to 
general welfare economics.   
Based on the strong assumptions on which the PSE is computed, its interpretation 
must be taken somewhat narrowly. The OECD originally adopted the PSE framework 
because it ￿incorporates explicitly all domestic agricultural policies directly or indirectly 
affecting trade￿ (Cahill and Legg, 1990 p. 14), and the PSE does provide a 
comprehensive measure of the support to farmers. But it is not feasible to interpret each 
dollar of PSE support as having the same effects on production or trade as any other 
dollar of support. The ultimate beneficiaries of support to agriculture are also an issue in 
the measurement and interpretation of PSEs for developed and developing countries. 
PSEs may overestimate the policy benefits to farmers if others capture a significant 
portion of the benefits. Several studies have demonstrated that a large share of the 
transfers from taxpayers and consumers to agricultural producers goes to other parts of 
the production chain or to fixed factors of production such as land. For example, Dewbre 
et al. (2001) find that subsidies on purchased inputs, which many developing countries 
rely on to transfer support to producers, are the least efficient in providing income to 
farmers. Burfisher and Hopkins (2003) calculate that farm operators may retain as little as 
40 percent of the benefits of the decoupled direct payments in the United States because 
the majority of the payments are capitalized into land values, resulting in higher rental 
rates. 
A comparison of two simple magnitudes illustrate the effects of these points 
vividly. While most CGE models indicate that full agricultural liberalization would 37 
increase world agricultural gross domestic product by US$40-80 billion per year (Oskam 
and Meester, 2003), the average 2000-2002 sum of total PSEs for OECD countries was 
US$235 billion (OECD, 2003). The sum of total PSEs is sometimes misinterpreted as the 
benefits that would accrue to non-subsidized agricultural producers under reform of 
agricultural policies, when those benefits are much smaller. 
Despite these shortcomings, PSEs are widely reported measures of agricultural 
subsidies and protection. With full understanding of the assumptions on which the PSE is 
based and the context in which it should be interpreted, the PSE can be a useful measure 
for comparison of support across commodities and countries. For this reason, a careful 
application and analysis of the PSE for developing countries is timely.  
 
4.  PSEs FOR INDIA AND CHINA 
 
  We now turn to our illustrative estimates of PSEs for India and China. In the 
following sections we 1) describe our data sources, 2) specify the adjustment methods we 
employ in various cases, 3) examine in depth the market price support, budgetary 
paytments, and product-specific PSEs for wheat in India with particular attention to how 
alternative adjustments influence the estimates we derive, and 4) extend the results to 
additional commodities in India and China, evaluating the effects of alternative scaling 
up procedures on the total PSE results. This analysis provides several alternative 
estimates of market price support and PSEs for India and China and we discuss directions 
for further research.  
4.1 DATA  SOURCES   
As discussed in section 3.1, computing PSEs is an intensive empirical exercise; 
for ideal research, data for all of the variables in equations (1) and (2) would be readily 38 
available. In reality, the empirical estimation of PSEs relies on both the available data and 
the analysts￿ judgments on how to minimize measurement errors.   
Our calculation of PSEs for India draws heavily on previous studies by Gulati et 
al. (1990), Gulati and Kelley (1999), Gulati and Narayanan (2003), and Gulati and 
Pursell (forthcoming). Data for the computation of the MPS is taken directly from the 
detailed database for 1964-65 to 2001-02 of Gulati and Pursell (forthcoming). This data 
includes reference prices for all main Indian crops, exchange rates and port charges. 
Production quantities, farmgate and price-support or wholesale domestic prices, domestic 
transport costs, and marketing and processing margins are included for important 
producing states. Sources for international prices in the database vary depending on the 
commodity and include USDA and FAO for cereals, Oil World for some oilseeds, and 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) for various other commodities. Exchange 
rates are taken from the IFS market rates. International freight for wheat is drawn from an 
annual series in the FAO Trade Yearbook, 1999 and adjusted for subsequent years. 
International freight for other commodities is given by adjusting the wheat freight rate if 
other rates are not available. Domestic prices are taken from Agricultural Prices in India, 
(various years) and production data is from Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, (various 
years). Estimates of port charges and domestic transportation costs are based on an earlier 
study by Sharma (1991) and are projected forward using the procedure described in 
Pursell and Gupta (1996). Marketing costs are taken as a percentage of Pd of each 
commodity and vary from 5 percent to 10 percent. For products requiring substantial 
processing, the prices included are at the wholesale (processed) level￿for these 
commodities, subsequent MPS calculations are made with price comparisons between 
adjusted references prices and prices of equivalent commodities at the wholesale, not 
farmgate, level. Aggregate estimates of subsidies on fertilizer, power and irrigation are 
from Gulati and Narayanan (2003) and are projected for 2000-2003.  
In the case of China we draw on results from work at IFPRI by Dongsheng Sun 
(2003). His data on agricultural production are drawn from Agricultural Statistics of 39 
China and China Rural Statistics Yearbooks published by China￿s State Statistics Bureau 
(SSB). The producer prices at the farmgate represent average prices farmers receive when 
selling their products and are drawn from the farm household survey published by State 
Development and Planning Committee (SDPC) in National Compilation of Costs and 
Benefits of Agricultural Products. The survey covers 60,000 farmer households in 1,550 
counties. The reference prices at the border (Pr) are calculated as unit value of exports or 
imports from China Customs Statistics. In the case of China, no adjustments to the 
reference prices are made for within country costs, but Sun (2003) makes several quality 
adjustments between the internationally traded and domestic goods.   
Information regarding budgetary expenditures on agriculture in China is collected 
from various sources; for example, it is drawn for 1996-1998 from China￿s domestic 
support table submitted to the WTO (WT/ACC/CHN/22). The foreign exchange rates are 
the medium price of China￿s official exchange rate, from China Statistic Yearbooks 
published by SSB. Support that is not product specific is allocated across commodities 
based on their share of the total value of agricultural production. Sun￿s analysis covers 
the period 1995-2001 and is comparable to earlier work for 1985-1994 by Cheng and Sun 
(1998). 
4.2   PSE ESTIMATION  
The starting point for estimation of the MPS components of the PSEs are 
equations (1) and (2). For many commodities in India, the direction of net trade varies 
among the years of our period of analysis, 1985-2002. For this reason, we compute and 
compare MPS and PSEs assuming both that the commodities are importables 
(￿importable hypothesis￿) and exportables (￿exportable hypothesis￿) in each year to 
demonstrate the effects of various adjustments. Then, we use a modified procedure based 
on the Byerlee and Morris (1993) approach in which we compute P
* and compare this 
price to the national average adjusted reference price for an import commodity and an 
export commodity. Depending on the relationship between P
* and Pm and Pe (i.e. if P
* is 40 
above, below, or between Pm and Pe) we use the relevant reference price to compute the 
MPS, as discussed in Section 3.2. 
4.2.1   MPS Calculations 
In India, for importables, the major consumption region is assumed to be the port 
cities, for example, Bombay. Reference prices at the border for imported commodities are 
calculated according to equation (3) for the quality level that most closely resembles that 
produced in India.
17 Reference prices at the border for export commodities are taken as 
the export prices of major competitors, Pexporterfob, for an equivalent quality level. This 
represents a departure from equation (4) and implicitly assumes that the international 
freight from the competing exporting country to a third-country importer and from India 
to a third-country importer are equal.  
Given the operation of the national price support policies, the existence of some 
state-level agricultural policies, and the interstate movement restrictions that were in 
place in India until 2002, farmers in various states are expected to receive different levels 
of protection or disprotection from the agricultural policy regime. For most of the major 
commodities in India, the Gulati-Pursell data allows representative analysis at the state 
level. Important producing states or regions are divided into ￿net surplus￿ and ￿net 
deficit￿ areas as described earlier. In calculating the MPS price gap, the point of 
comparison between the imported commodity and the commodity produced in the surplus 
region is assumed to be the wholesale market in the port city, with the adjusted reference 
price for a ￿net surplus￿ region under the importable hypothesis given by: 
(17)  ( ) ( ) ( ) s s w p i i orterfob ar M T C C T P P
s + − + + + = : exp  
                                                 
17 Given the small trade volumes of the major commodities in India, there is substantial variation between 
import and export unit values and the commonly applied international prices series (i.e. U.S. hard red 
winter wheat f.o.b. U.S. Gulf, U.S. number 2 yellow corn f.o.b. U.S. Gulf, and Thai rice prices f.o.b. 
Bangkok). See Cheng (2004) for comparisons between unit values and international prices. Instead of using 
unit values, we follow Gulati et al. (1990) and select international prices for the quality level that is 
comparable to that produced domestically.     41 
where the transportation costs from the port to the port-city wholesale market (Td1) are 
assumed inconsequential, Tw:s is the transportation cost from the surplus region to the 
port-city wholesale market, and Ms is marketing costs in the surplus region. The adjusted 
reference price for a deficit region can then be computed, following the procedure of 
Gulati et al. (1990) and Pursell and Gupta (1996), as either the adjusted reference price 
given by equation (1) for imports coming directly to the deficit region, or as the adjusted 
reference price of a nearby surplus region plus the transportation, handling and marketing 
costs from the surplus region to the deficit region, given by: 
(18)  ( ) d s d ar ar M T P P
s d + + = :  
where Td:s is the transportation cost from the surplus to the deficit region and Md is 
marketing costs in the deficit region.  
If the commodity is an export, only surplus regions are included in our analysis. 
In this case the adjusted reference price is: 
(19)  ( ) ( ) M T C P P d p orterfob ar + − − = 2 exp  
which is essentially equation (2) with Td1 assumed inconsequential and quality of the 
domestic and international commodity assumed to be equivalent. 
Once state-level adjusted reference prices are derived, state-level nominal MPS 
can be computed. These results are then aggregated for the included states and the total 
expanded to an estimate of the national average MPS (see Pursell and Gupta, 1996). A 
national average Pm and Pe can also be computed using the value of production in the 
included states as the weights. It is the national average import and export adjusted 
reference prices that are compared to a P* estimated at the national level to determine the 
adjusted reference price in application of the MPS modified procedure. 
On the choice of timeframe, for India we use average harvest season prices where 
available. If the large majority of farmers sell their products during the harvest season, 
then seasonal prices are the best indicators of the incentives to farmers resulting from the 42 
difference between domestic and international prices. In cases where we use domestic 
harvest season prices, international prices and exchange rates pertaining to the same 
timeframe are also utilized. We calculate the MPS based on all production, rather than 
marketable surplus, thereby making the assumption that producers value all of their 
production at the domestic price, even if some is consumed on-farm.  
For China, Pr is given by the import or export unit value.
 18 Given the limited data 
available for China, in the preliminary calculations reported herein, we have only 
adjusted Pr to reflect differences in international and domestic quality, where such 
difference are assumed to exist. Thus, for these commodities: 
(20)  adj r ar Q P P − =  
We recognize that in omitting internal cost adjustments our results for China have a 
downward bias in the case of import commodities whenever (Cp + Td1 ) < ( Td2+ M ). 
Omitting internal costs in the case of export commodities will result in a systematic 
downward bias, to the extent that ( Cp + Td1 ) + ( Td2+ M ) > 0. We plan to evaluate the 
magnitude of this bias for China in future research.  
4.2.2   Budgetary Payments 
For India, wherever possible we use subsidies on tradable inputs that have been 
computed via a comparison of farm-level prices with comparable adjusted reference 
(￿import parity￿) prices, analogously to the output price gap calculations. In particular, 
we use Gulati and Narayanan￿s (2003) fertilizer subsidy estimates that are based on these 
price differences. Since it is not possible to obtain an import parity price for non-tradable 
inputs, subsidies or taxes on these factors of production must be measured via budgetary 
                                                 
18 See Sun (2003). While the use of import or export unit values can be problematic for commodities where 
the trade volume is small or where the traded quality differs from the domestically produced quality, Cheng 
(2004) shows that for China, unlike for India, unit import and export values move reasonably closely with 
the international prices of major exporters. Use of unit values to compute the adjusted reference prices 
eliminates measurement errors in computing international transport costs, but could increase measurement 
errors due to quality differences.  43 
outlays, or if data allows on the difference between the cost to the government of 
supplying certain services (i.e. power or irrigation) and the fees charged for those 
services (Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). Fertilizer subsidies are allocated across 
commodities based on the commodity￿s share of fertilizer usage, while irrigation and 
power subsides are distributed based on the share of irrigated area (as reported in USDA, 
1994).  
For China, budgetary outlays include input subsidies, relief payments and regional 
assistance programs. Agricultural taxes and forgone agricultural taxes are also included. 
Non-product specific payments are allocated to individual commodities based on their 
share of the total value of agricultural production.  
4.3   RESULTS FOR INDIA 
Turning now to our results for India, we draw on the detailed data available to 
demonstrate how various adjustments to the reference price affect the resulting MPS 
values for wheat (1985-2003), then extend our results to rice and corn (1985-2002) and 
estimates of a total PSE on this basis. India is the third largest producer and consumer of 
wheat. A minimum support price (MSP) has been and remains in place at which the 
government procures wheat, providing a price floor for farmers. The effects of the 
restrictions on domestic wheat movements among states and even districts, and the 
stocking limits on private traders have been to drive down the ￿farm harvest price￿ to the 
MSP. Thus, throughout the period of our analysis, the MSP is effectively the price 
received by producers.  
World price fluctuations, government policy and domestic market shocks are 
factors that have affected both the net trade and changing stock levels of wheat in India. 
Since wheat is a storable commodity, the gap between supply and demand can be 
attributed to the sum of stock accumulation and net exports. Over the period 1985-2003, 
there is considerable variability in net exports and changes in stocks, though not always 44 
in the same direction (Figure 2). If supply is greater than demand for any given year, 
stocks are accumulating or the country is a net exporter, or both. If supply is less than 
demand for any given year, stocks are decreasing or the country is a net importer, or both. 
Sometimes these adjustments work in opposite directions: for example, with stocks rising 
and imports occurring. 
In terms of India￿s wheat trade in particular, exports were restricted until 1995, 
and from 1985 to 1994 India imported very little wheat (see Figure 2) except in two years 
(1988 and 1992) when production fell short of domestic consumption. Recall that wheat 
and other cereal imports are subject to state trading by the FCI. In 1995, the Indian 
government moved wheat onto the list of freely exportable goods. As exports started 
picking up, there was upward pressure on domestic wheat prices and the government 
hastily banned exports in 1996 and opened up imports of wheat at zero import duty. In 
particular, the roller flourmills in southern India succeeded in securing the right to import 
wheat freely, although initially not much came in, as domestic prices were below world 
prices.
19 But in the following years, especially from 1998 onwards, the world prices of 
wheat and most other agricultural commodities fell, while Indian support prices 
continued to rise. India imported some wheat in 1998 and 1999, despite bumper crops 
harvested in these years. This led to a situation where imports were coming in even as 
domestic food grain stocks reached unprecedented levels. To stem the flow of imports, 
the government raised the import duty from zero to 50 percent on December 1, 1999 
against a WTO bound rate of 100 percent. The government also started offloading wheat 
stocks to private traders for export at concessional rates￿about 75 percent of the 
minimum support price in 2001 (USDA, 2002b). Under these policies, over the past three 
years India has emerged as a net exporter of low quality wheat, shipping an estimated 5 
million tons in 2002/03 to South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
                                                 
19 The motivation behind this policy change reflects an interesting aspect of the political economy of trade 
policy. Roller flourmills have always complained about the constraints they face in procuring wheat (grown 
mainly in the northern states). They argue for instance, that the northern industry, which is closer to the 
central government and has better bargaining power gains from discriminatory pricing of the FCI￿s open 
market sale of wheat (Business Line, 2001). 45 





















































































Change in Stocks  Net Exports Total
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, February 2004. 
4.3.1   MPS for Wheat Under the Import, Export and OECD Transition-Economy 
Assumptions 
Price comparisons and annual estimates of the wheat %MPS for 1985 to 2003 are 
shown under several alternative assumptions in Table 1. In our calculations, we compute 
the MPS based on the difference between the minimum support price for wheat each year 
(Pd in Table 1) taken as a proxy for domestic farmgate price and the adjusted reference 
prices. The unadjusted reference prices for exports (Pexporterfob in Table 1) are taken in 
U.S. dollars as the price of U.S. hard red winter wheat f.o.b. U.S. Gulf.
20 Adding the 
international transportation costs from the U.S. Gulf to India to Pexporterfob, gives Pcif, a 
U.S. dollar unadjusted reference price for imports. Simple multiplication of the prices and 
the exchange rate gives these unadjusted border prices in rupees per ton. The unadjusted 
reference prices are not shown in Table 1. Instead the average adjusted reference prices 
(Pm and Pe) are given following equations (17) ￿ (19) and the data sources, internal 
                                                 
20 There could be a systematic downward bias in the MPS given by a comparison of Par based on the price 
of U.S. hard red winter wheat without quality adjustments and Pd if the quality of U.S. hard red winter 
wheat is better than Indian wheat. The internationally traded wheat that is most similar in quality to Indian 
wheat is Australian Standard White or General Purpose (Stevens, 2003). However, export prices of 
Australian wheat are not available, thus we follow earlier studies and use U.S. prices, recognizing that our 
results could fail to account for quality differences.  46 
adjustments and regional averaging described above. Our estimates (discussed below) of 
the market-clearing autarky prices (P
*) are also shown in Table 1. 
Under the importable hypothesis, we compute the wheat MPS for two key surplus 
states (Haryana and Punjab) and one main deficit state (Uttar Pradesh). We then 
aggregate the results to a national level. Under the exportable hypothesis, we compute the 
wheat MPS by state for Haryana and Punjab and derive our national estimate from these 
results. In the MPS results in Table 1, the national results based on the internal cost 
adjustments and state-based aggregation are shown under both the importable and 
exportable hypothesis (these estimates are labelled ￿Adjusted Reference Prices￿). We 
also compute a simplified MPS based on the difference between the minimum support 
price, MSP, and the unadjusted reference prices at the border (c.i.f. for importables, f.o.b. 
for exportables) without internal adjustments (labelled ￿Unadjusted Border Price￿). We 
also report the MPS for wheat using the OECD transition-economy approximation given 
by equation (8) in Table 1. 
These results in Table 1 suggest several important findings. First, for wheat in 
India under the importable hypothesis the results with internal adjustments do not differ 
significantly from those without internal adjustments. Recall in the specification of Par, 
that for imports Cp is added to Pr, while Tw:s and Ms are subtracted from Pr, for a surplus 
region. While Td:s, and Md are added back to Pars to obtain the adjusted reference price for 
a deficit region, the effect is that the net adjustment is small when averaged across 
regions, and the difference between the %MPS with internal adjustments and at the 
border without internal adjustments is also small.  
Second, there is a greater difference for the unadjusted and adjusted reference 
prices under the exportable hypothesis than under the importable hypothesis. Under the 
exportable hypothesis, the %MPS results with the adjusted reference price are greater 
than for the unadjusted reference price by 12.0 percent (in 1996) to 59.9 percent (in 
2000). Recall that in the specification of Par for an export that Cp, Tw:s and M are 
subtracted from Pr. This has important implications for computing the MPS for export 
commodities. The MPS based on a comparison of domestic prices and unadjusted 47 
reference prices can have a large systematic downward bias if internal adjustments are 
large.  
Third, when comparing the results for adjusted border price under the importable 
and exportable hypotheses with the OECD transition-economy approach, the latter 
method seems to be a hybrid of the two, with the results falling between the two. The 
%MPS under the OECD transition-economy approach are most similar to the %MPS 
under the exportable hypothesis at the unadjusted border price. The results under the 
OECD transition economy approach are equivalent to the %MPS under the exportable 
hypothesis at the unadjusted border price plus M/Par or 0.06*Pd/Par, since the marketing 
and processing costs from the farmgate to the wholesale market are taken as a percentage 
(in this case six percent) of the domestic price.  
Turning now to the substantive issue of levels of protection or disprotection, we 
focus on our estimates of the %MPS with adjusted reference prices. The results under the 
exportable hypothesis are greater than those under the importable hypothesis because 
under the exportable hypothesis, the domestic price is compared to the adjusted reference 
price of an efficient exporter, which is less than the adjusted reference price for India as 
an importer. Under both the importable and exportable hypotheses, there are large 
fluctuations in the %MPS over time, partly being counter-cyclical to international price 
movements and partly reflecting changes in the domestic support price. Generally, the 
level of protection (disprotection) increases (decreases) when world prices are low and 
decreases (increases) when world prices are high. The MPS is consistently negative under 
the importable hypothesis but varies from -4.3, -6.3 and -15.2 percent in 1986, 1987 and 
2000, respectively, when world prices were relatively low, to -55.4 percent when world 
prices peaked in 1996 and 1997. Under the exportable hypothesis, the %MPS has a 
similar pattern, being highest in 2000 (74.8 percent) when the combination of rising 
support prices and falling world prices increased the implicit level of protection, and 
lowest in 1996 and 1997 (-34.1 percent) when world prices were high. Disprotection 
under the importables hypothesis is less, and protection greater under the exportables 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The wide range of %MPS results for wheat over time and under the importable 
hypothesis compared to the exportable hypothesis, raise some questions as to what 
exactly have been the levels of protection or disprotection of wheat in India over various 
years. To further complicate matters, wheat is essentially a non-traded commodity (net 
trade less than 500,000 tons) in over one-third of the years between 1985-2003. Thus, it is 
not always clear if the domestic price should be compared to an import or export adjusted 
reference price. Given these concerns, we explore how the results change when we select 
the appropriate adjusted reference price based on the relationship between world prices 
and the autarky price in each year using our modified procedure.  
4.3.2   MPS for Wheat with Possible Market-Clearing Domestic Prices 
As opposed to applying the importable or exportable hypothesis based on net 
trade in each particular year, following the Byerlee and Morris (1993) procedure we 
compute the level of protection or disprotection relative to the relevant adjusted reference 
price (Par) given in equation (16). To do so it is necessary to compute an estimate of P
*, 
which requires some information on the price elasticity of demand and on domestic 
consumption quantities and prices.
21 The elasticity estimates available in the literature 
vary widely depending on the model and data used, and our calculation of P
* will vary 
depending on the elasticity assumed. Not binding ourselves to any particular estimate, we 
use -0.5 as an illustrative value, as used in Gulati and Kelly (1999).
22 We supplement the 
Gulati and Pursell database with domestic consumption for 1985-2003 from the USDA-
FAS Production, Supply and Demand database (USDA, 2004).
23 For simplicity, we have 
assumed that the initial consumer price is equivalent to Pd. We then compute the %MPS 
                                                 
21 Consistent with the standard PSE methodology, we assume that ex post supply is fixed. Supply 
elasticities are also needed if the PSE assumption of zero supply elasticity is relaxed. 
22 See Dev et al. (2004) for recent discussion of demand being even more inelastic, about -0.2. 
23 P
* is computed by first finding the slope of the demand curve (assumed to be linear) from the elasticity of 
demand, εd = -( 1 / b )*( Pd / Qd ), where b is the slope and Qd is the quantity demanded. Then b is used to 
compute the intercept, a, in Pd = a - bQd. We can then use this equation to solve for P
*, where the ex post 
quantity supplied, Qs, is equal to Qd.  50 
(labeled ￿Modified Procedure￿) using the relevant adjusted reference price after 
comparing our estimated P
* for each year to the adjusted reference prices Pm and Pe.
  
In addition to the variability in the direction of trade over the period of analysis, 
the relevant adjusted reference price, shown in bold in Table 1, also varies across years. 
Between 1985-1991, there is fluctuation from year to year. The relevant Par is P
* in 1986, 
1989 and 1991, Pm in  1987 and 1988, and Pe in 1985 and 1990. In these various years, if 
the policy interventions were removed, wheat, in principle, would have been not traded, 
imported and exported, respectively. By 1990, the domestic price, Pd was below the 
relevant Par and %MPS was negative (-22.2 percent in 1990 and -9.0 percent in 1991). 
During 1992-1998, Pe is the relevant Par, meaning that without policy interventions, India 
would have been an exporter in these years. Because the %MPS is negative in all of these 
years except 1998, producers were disprotected relative to Pe. Partly the disprotection 
arises from relatively strong world prices during this period and partly from a nominal 
depreciation of the Indian currency of 80 percent between 1990 and 1993 (the latter effect 
raises the adjusted reference price in domestic currency). Had the currency not been 
depreciated, the calculated levels of disprotection under the exportable (or importable) 
hypothesis would not have been as large; conversely, overvaluation of the exchange rate 
before the depreciation leads to lower reported disprotection than otherwise in those 
years.  
During 1999-2003, P
* is the relevant reference price for wheat in India, implying 
that without policy interventions India would have been self-sufficient in wheat 
production, but would not have imported or exported (or experience changes in 
intervention stock levels) because Pm is ￿too high￿ for imports to be competitive and Pe is 
￿too low￿ relative to P
* for exports to compete on the world market (as in Figure 1c). In 
1998-2001, as world prices fell, cash subsidy payments to farmers in the United States 
and farm support in other developed countries were increased, allowing exports to 
continue even with low prices. In India, the MSP also rose, and wheat stocks built up that 
could not be exported without subsidies because the domestic price was higher than the 51 
world price. As a result of these international and domestic factors, the %MPS from our 
modified procedure reaches a high of 40.0 percent in 2000. But the estimated level of 
protection is less than under a conventional exportable assumption. In 2002 and 2003, the 
domestic price is slightly below P
*, corresponding to decreasing stocks, and resulting in a 
small negative %MPS in these years. Figure 3 shows the movements of the %MPS under 
this modified procedure compared with those under the importable and exportable 
hypotheses.  
Figure 3￿India Wheat %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable 























































































Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPSmp are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the   
         modified procedure, respectively. 
4.3.3   Product-Specific Wheat PSE for India 
 We now dispense with all but our modified procedure estimate of the %MPS and 
proceed to the calculation of the product-specific %PSE for wheat. To the nominal MPS, 
we add the budgetary payments allocated to wheat producers, which are based on 
estimate wheat use of fertilizer (27.65% of the total fertilizer subsidies) and acreage 
under irrigation (31.05% of the total irrigation and power subsidies). Adding the nominal 52 
MPS for wheat and the budgetary payments allocated to wheat gives the nominal wheat 
PSE.  
Given the nominal PSE, we can examine the way a ￿subsidy counter￿ and a ￿trade 
economist￿ might compute the wheat %PSE. Recall that the subsidy counter is interested 
in finding the proportion of gross farm income that is a result of policy measures, while 
the trade economist is interested in comparing the magnitude of the transfers due to 
policy measures relative to value of production at adjusted reference prices. In the lower 
part of Table 1, we have computed the wheat %PSE under both approaches to choosing 
the denominator. The %PSE according to the trade economist￿s approach is always 
greater than the OECD or subsidy counter￿s approach (labeled ￿OECD Denominator￿ in 
Table 1) when the PSE is positive and less (in absolute value) than the subsidy counter￿s 
approach when the PSE is negative. These results follow from the relationship between 
the two denominators.
24 For wheat in India, the difference is often small and mostly less 
than 10 percent. An except is when the MPS is a large positive number. For example, in 
2000, the %PSE under the trade economist￿s approach is 78.3 percent, compared to 43.9 
percent under the subsidy counter￿s approach, a difference of 34.4 percent. 
We have now used the example of wheat in India to explore empirically three 
related issues: 1) the impacts of internal cost adjustments on the resulting MPS 
calculation, 2) the relationship among the MPS under the importable and exportable 
hypotheses and the Byerlee-Morris type of modified procedure, and 3) an evaluation of 
the %PSE using the subsidy counter￿s and trade economist￿s measurements. In the next 
section, we extend our analysis to rice and corn and demonstrate empirically the issues 
related to scaling up from the commodities covered in the analysis.    
                                                 
24 The value of production at adjusted reference prices is its value at domestic prices minus the nominal 
MPS. The subsidy counter denominator is larger when product-specific PSE is positive because (MPS + 
BP) for the commodity is greater than zero. Conversely, when the product-specific PSE is negative, the 
subsidy counter denominator is smaller in absolute value because (MPS + BP) is less than zero. 53 
4.3.4   Multiple Commodities and ￿Total￿ PSE  
Recall that if the MPS is not computed for all commodities, one is left with two 
choices on how to proceed with the calculation of the PSE for all of agriculture. One 
could assume that the MPS of the omitted commodities is equal to zero and thus the sum 
of the MPS for the covered commodities plus total budgetary payments to agriculture is 
the best estimate of the total PSE. Alternatively, one could assume that the MPS of the 
omitted commodities is equal to the average of the included commodities and scale up the 
MPS results as in equation (12). As discussed in Section 3.1.3, either assumption can 
misstate the actual protection or disprotection of the commodities not covered, and thus 
introduces a measurement error.  
We can demonstrate the empirical impacts of these alternative assumptions by 
taking a three-commodity example. To our MPS for wheat computed in the previous 
section, we add the MPS for rice and corn in India. We continue to apply the modified 
procedure to estimate the price gap. Thus, we compute P
* for rice and corn for each year 
using the same procedure as for wheat and again assuming demand elasticities of -0.5. 
Using the relevant Par according to equation (16), we then compute the MPS for rice and 
corn in India. The results, their relationship to those under the importable and exportable 
hypotheses, and the stock and trade positions for both commodities are shown in Figures 
4-7.  
In Table 2, MPSc refers to the sum of the nominal MPS for wheat, rice and corn. 
MPS is equal to MPSc divided by the included commodities￿ share of the total value of 
agricultural production. In this example, these three commodities represent about 26 
percent of the total value of agricultural production, less than the benchmark 70 percent 
that the OECD aims to cover. Yet, for illustrative purposes, our three-commodity set is 
sufficient to demonstrate, potentially in an exaggerated fashion, the effects of scaling up. 
Budgetary payments shown in Table 2 are the sum of fertilizer, power and irrigation 
subsidies for all agriculture. 54 





















































































Change in Stocks Net Exports Total
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, February 2004. 
 
Figure 5￿India Rice %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable and 




















































































Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPSmp are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the 
modified procedure, respectively. 55 

























































































Change in stocks Net exports Total
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, February 2004. 
 
Figure 7￿India Corn %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable and 



















































Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPSmp are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the  



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The impact of the scaling up procedure is to magnify the positive or negative 
market price support for the included commodities. The MPS is greater in absolute value 
than the MPSc (Table 2). The resulting PSEc and PSE differ not only in magnitude, but 
also in sign for numerous years. For example, MPSc and MPS are Rs. -117.0 billion and 
Rs. -447.1 billion, respectively, in 1999. Since the total budgetary payments are Rs. 357.5 
billion, the PSEc is Rs. 240.5 billion, while the PSE is Rs. -89.7 billion. Because of 
scaling up, the magnitude of the estimated (negative) market price support becomes 
greater than that of the (positive) budgetary payments. Overall, the PSE shows a pattern 
of disprotection during the 1990s and protection more recently. This pattern in muted in 
the PSEc which only shows disprotection in a few years. 
Table 2 also reports the %PSEc and %PSE using the ￿OECD￿ (subsidy counter) 
and ￿trade economist￿ denominators.
25 The results with the OECD denominator are again 
larger (smaller) in absolute value than those for the trade economist denominator when 
the %PSE is negative (positive), but the differences are small in most years. For either 
measure, the difference between the %PSEc and %PSE can be large and they can be of 
different signs. 
Figure 8 presents the aggregate conclusion from our analysis for India in 
graphical form. The first estimate is %PSEc from Table 2 (using the modified procedure, 
not scaling up, but using the OECD calculation of support as a percentage of domestic 
farm income). It shows policy to have been close to neutral in its aggregate effect from 
1985 through the late 1990s, with a persistent increase in support since 1998. The second 
estimate is the %PSE (again using the modified procedure and OECD denominator, but 
now with scaling up). Here a more pronounced discrimination against agriculture is 
evident from the late 1980s to late 1990s, followed again by a period of aggregate support 
for agriculture. Thus, by either measure policy in India has recently been to support 
agriculture and to do so more than in previous years. Additional analysis with an 
                                                 
25 For total value of production at international adjusted reference prices we have approximated simply by 
subtracting the nominal MPS for wheat, rice and corn from the value of total production at domestic prices. 58 
extended set of covered commodities is needed to determine with more precision where 
the PSE for India lies with respect to these two estimates.  
























































































Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
Note: PSEc is without scaling up; PSE is with scaling up (see text for discussion). 
4.4 RESULTS  FOR  CHINA 
We turn now to the analysis for China for which our data is not as detailed as in 
the case of India. For China, we use unadjusted reference prices at the border computed 
primarily based on import or export unit values. We consider five commodities (wheat, 
soybeans, sugar, rice, and corn), based on an analysis by Sun (2003) for the period 1995-
2001.
26 For each of these commodities, we utilize either the importable (wheat, soybeans, 
sugar) or exportable (rice and corn) hypothesis based on trade patterns to determine the 
                                                 
26 This represents a subset of the twenty-one commodities covered by Sun (2003). However, by including 
only the major agricultural commodities, we avoid the difficulties of computing an appropriate adjusted 
reference price for some highly differentiated horticulture and livestock products, for which only very 
limited data is available.  59 
reference price based on the unit value￿we have not applied the Byerlee-Morris type of 
modified procedure to these estimates. Thus our results for China are much less precise 
than for India. Still, some interesting patterns emerge. Beginning with the import 
commodities, we discuss each in turn in the context of how well the MPS measurements 
correspond to the existing policy setting and to other studies of price gap measures. 
Earlier studies of PSEs in China have mostly found that agricultural producers are 
disprotected, though the level of disprotection is highly variable across studies (Tian et 
al., 2002). 
4.4.1   MPS for Five Major Commodities 
 In our work on India, for imported commodities, the port charges and the 
transport and marketing costs from the farm to the wholesale market tended to cancel out. 
Extrapolating from these results, if data are not available for these adjustments, and the 
quality of the domestic production is similar to the imported quality, then a comparison 
of domestic price and an unadjusted reference price, such as the import unit value, may 
provide a reasonable approximation of the MPS.
  
Beginning with wheat, China is the largest consumer, second largest producer, 
and from 1990-1996 was a large net importer (Figure 9). In response to stagnant grain 
production in the early 1990s, the government increased quota prices for grains by 40 
percent (OECD, 2002) and introduced the GGBRS, as discussed above. As a result of this 
renewed emphasis on grain production, China￿s wheat imports fell and in 2000 China 
became a net exporter. With greater production, the domestic market price for wheat 
began to fall below the quota price and the implicit tax of the quota price on farmers 
became a subsidy. When domestic market prices for wheat (and corn) dropped 
dramatically in 1997, the government introduced a ￿protective price￿ below the quota 
price for the remaining amount of grain sold by farmers. The protective price was set to 
cover all costs and include a small profit (OECD, 2002). The quota and protective prices 
have been cut every year since 1998. However, the GGBRS led to a large accumulation 60 
of low quality wheat stocks requiring an increasingly interventionist administrative 
system to manage. In 1999 the government cut the amount of wheat procured within the 
quota system, further reduced quota and protective prices, set more stringent quality 
requirements for wheat purchased within the quota system, and excluded some regions 
from the protective price and quota system altogether (OECD, 2002). In the major 
producing provinces the protective prices remain in place, although for most of the past 
three years, they have been below market prices (USDA, 2003a). Reduced planted area in 
each of the past three years is attributed at least in part to the lower procurement price 
and reduced grain quota.  






































































Source: Sun, 2003 for 1990-2002; USDA PSD Database, February 2004 for 2003.  
Note: 2003 refers to projected trade for July 2003/June 2004. All others are calendar year. 
When China entered the WTO in 2001, it agreed to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for 
selected key import commodities. In 2002, the TRQ for wheat was set at 8.468 million 
tons, with an in-quota tariff of one percent and an over-quota tariff of 71 percent. Ten 
percent of the quota is allocated to non-state trade. By 2004, the quota is scheduled to 
increase to 9.636 million tons and the over-quota duty will fall to 65 percent. China 
typically imports mostly high quality wheat from North America, but during 2001-2003, 
China imported less than 3.4 million tons (Figure 9). Meanwhile, over the same period, 61 
China exported a total of 3.9 million tons of low quality wheat. China has subsidized 
exports of wheat in an attempt to reduce stocks (USDA, 2003a). 
The MPS for wheat in China is computed based on the difference between 
producer prices and import unit values adjusted downward by 10 percent to account for 
the higher quality of imported compared to domestically produced wheat. Clearly, one 
must be cautious in comparing a single producer price of wheat in China, where many 
different qualities are produced to an import unit value that corresponds to the average 
import quality, which could very well differ from the average domestic quality of wheat 
(Huang and Rozelle, 2003). Yet, in this aggregate comparison the counter-cyclical pattern 
that was evident in the case of the MPS of Indian wheat and international price is less 
obvious in the aggregate data for the producer price in China and the world price. The 
domestic farmgate price in China actually decreased more than international prices after 
1996. Correspondingly, the estimated MPS for wheat in China is negative in 1996-2001 
(Table 3). Compared to other studies, Tian et al. (2002) find the PSE for wheat to be 
positive in 1994-2001, but only in the range of 1 to 7 percent. The authors conclude that 
the actual benefits to farmers of the new grain policies are small due to institutional 
arrangements that hamper the effectiveness of the procurement price scheme. In their 
computation of NPRs for China￿s major commodities, Huang and Rozelle (2002) find 
that the average NPR weighted by production shares of individual wheat varieties was 10 
percent in 2001, which is again different from our results, suggesting that we may not 
have made an adequate adjustment for quality differences. 
China￿s domestic oilseed markets have relatively less government intervention 
than the grain sector (OECD, 2002). Nearly all oilseeds are purchased at market prices 
and there are no restrictions on enterprises that import oilseeds and oilseed meals. 
China￿s current oilseed policy is focused on providing sufficient quantities of oilseeds for 
its growing crushing capacity (OECD, 2002).  
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Table 3￿China MPS and ￿Total￿ PSE Under Alternative Adjustments, 1995-2001  
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
%MPS
Wheat 30.0 -5.4 -5.1 -4.4 -15.2 -19.5 -19.8
Soybeans 20.3 23.3 23.6 8.6 16.4 14.0 16.0
Sugar 44.6 31.7 27.8 20.0 11.2 17.7 16.4
Rice -12.3 -25.3 -5.1 2.5 -10.4 3.8 11.7
Corn 38.2 -27.6 3.5 14.5 0.9 3.6 12.1
Measured Support (US$ bil)
MPSc 2.1 -27.6 -3.4 2.6 -7.7 -1.2 2.0
BP -2.7 0.7 0.8 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.2
Covered Share 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.22
MPS (US$ bil) 4.8 -66.7 -9.9 7.9 -27.3 -5.4 9.1
Nominal PSE (US$ bil)
PSEc -0.6 -26.9 -2.6 5.1 -5.7 0.6 4.1
PSE 2.0 -66.0 -9.1 10.4 -25.3 -3.6 11.3
PSE (%)
OECD Denominator
PSEc -0.3 -11.4 -1.0 2.0 -2.2 0.2 1.5
PSE 1.0 -28.0 -3.6 4.0 -9.9 -1.4 4.1
Trade Economist Denominator
PSEc -0.3 -10.2 -1.0 2.0 -2.2 0.2 1.5
PSE 1.0 -25.1 -3.6 4.1 -9.6 -1.4 4.2
 
Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
Note:  MPSc and PSEc include only the market price support calculated for wheat, rice and corn; MPS and 
PSE are based on scaling up this market price support   by dividing MPSc by the share of these 
commodities in the total value of agricultural production (see text for discussion).  
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In 1998 and 1999 the government took several steps to reduce oilseed meal and 
edible oil imports and increase oilseed imports (see Figure 10) by reducing the quota on 
edible oil imports, cracking down on under-invoicing of edible oil imports, and reversing 
an earlier policy to offer a rebate on the VAT of imported oilseed meals (OECD, 2002). 
Soybeans and soymeal are subject to bound tariffs of 3 and 5 percent, respectively. In 
2002, the soybean oil TRQ was 2.335 million tons with an in-quota duty of 9 percent and 
an over-quota duty of 48 percent. Two-thirds of the quota is allocated to non-state trade. 
After 2005, the soybean oil tariff regime will be converted to a bound tariff of 9 percent. 
China is the largest soybean importer, with purchases of over 21 million tons in 2003 
(Figure 10). China was also the largest importer of soybean oil in 2003, surpassing India.   
The soybean %MPS is positive, varying from 8.6 percent to 23.6 percent in 1995-
2001 and averages 17.5 percent (Table 3). It may seem surprising that the %MPS for 
soybeans is greater than the import duty rate of 3 percent given that there are such large 
quantities of imports. However, the average %MPS in 1995-2001 is very close to the 
average NPR of 15 percent in 2001 in Huang and Rozelle￿s (2002) study. The authors 
point out that importers must pay a 13 percent VAT on imported soybeans, while 
domestic soybeans are taxed at a rate of less than one percent. Hence, the tax system 
provides a measure of protection to domestic soybean producers, which seems to be 
captured in our MPS estimates. 
Sugar is also an important import commodity in China, although in 1992 and 
1993, China was a net exporter of sugar (Figure 11). In 1999-2001, China was the third 
largest sugarcane producer after Brazil and India and the tenth largest sugar beet 
producer. Ninety percent of China￿s sugar production comes from sugarcane, while the 
remainder is from sugar beets (Mitchell, 2004). Most imports come from Cuba under a 
long-term trade agreement. In the 1990s, China pursued sugar policies aimed at achieving 
self-sufficiency and improving farm incomes (Mitchell, 2003; ERS, 2003). This included 
setting minimum procurement prices for sugarcane in major producing provinces that are 
linked to increases in sugar prices. In 2002, cane prices were required to increase $0.60 64 
per ton for every $12 per ton increase in the market price for sugar above a set base of 
$325 per ton (ERS, 2003).  



































































Source: FAOSTAT for 1990-2002; USDA PSD Database, February 2004 for 2003.  
Note: 2003 refers to trade for October 2002/September 2003. All others are calendar year. 
 




































































Source: FAOSTAT for 1990-2002; USDA PSD Database, February 2004 for 2003.  
Note: 2003 refers to trade for October 2002/September 2003. All others are calendar year. 65 
When China joined the WTO in 2001, it agreed to a TRQ for sugar. In 2002, the 
TRQ was set at 1.764 million tons with an in-quota tariff rate of 20 percent and an over-
quota rate of 76 percent. In 2004, the quota is scheduled to increase to 1.945 million tons, 
the in-quota rate will fall to 15 percent, and the over-quota tariff rate is scheduled to 
decrease to 65 percent. Thirty percent of the quota is allocated to non-state trade.  
The %MPS for sugar is positive throughout the entire period 1995-2001, 
reflecting the protective sugar policies in place in China (Table 3). The %MPS decreases 
from 44.6 percent in 1995 to 11.2 percent in 1999, consistent with the falling domestic 
prices (in 1999) as a result of the record crop harvested in 1998/99 (Mitchell, 2004). 
Rising domestic prices in 2000 and 2001 leads to an increasing %MPS of 16-18 percent 
in these years, which is slightly less than the in-quota tariff rate of 20 percent. The MPS 
may underestimate the level of protection compared with the tariff due to the assumptions 
that we use to compute sugar prices from sugarcane prices.  The domestic sugarcane 
price is converted to a domestic sugar price by dividing the cane price by the product of 
the recovery rate and farmer￿s share of the sugar price. If we have overestimated the 
recovery rate or farmer￿s share of the sugar price, the imputed sugar price will be lower 
than it otherwise should be. For comparison, Huang and Rozelle (2002) find the NPR for 
sugar is about 40 percent in 2001, while Tian et al. (2002) find the %PSE for sugar to 
vary between negative four and eight percent in 1995-2000.   
Next we turn to the calculation of the %MPS for two of China￿s export 
commodities, rice and corn. Recall that our results for India suggest that the omission of 
domestic transport and marketing costs can lead to a systematic downward bias in the 
MPS results under the exportable hypothesis, since all the internal cost adjustments to the 
international reference price are subtractive (see equation 2).  
China is the largest rice producing and consuming country and accounts for nearly 
one-third of the global rice economy. Rice is an important strategic commodity and its 
production has been managed with the use of procurement prices to ensure stable 
supplies (Wailes, 2003). As for wheat, the GGBRS also led to large increases in 66 
government stocks of rice in the late 1990s, which reached approximately 100 million 
tons, or 73 percent of domestic use (Wailes, 2003). In 1999 the government eliminated 
the purchase of low quality early season rice and lowered procurement prices for rice. In 
some coastal provinces, the procurement policy has been completely eliminated (OECD, 
2002). 
China is a significant exporter of low quality long grain and medium grain rice 
(Figure 12). Exports are made by the state trading enterprise COFCO, without significant 
export subsidies (Huang and Rozelle, 2002). China also imports mainly premium Thai 
jasmine rice for high-income urban consumers. In 2002, the total rice TRQ was 3.990 
million tons, divided evenly between short and medium-grain and long-grain rice. The in-
quota duty is one percent, the over-quota duty is 60 percent, and the share allocated in 
non-state trade is 50 percent for short and medium-grain rice and 10 percent for long-
grain rice. The total rice TRQ is scheduled to increase to 5.320 million tons in 2004 and 
the over-quota tariff will decrease to 40 percent.   




































































Source: Sun, 2003 for 1990-2002; USDA PSD Database, February 2004 for 2003.  67 
The %MPS for rice in China suggest that domestic rice is slightly protected in 
some years, for example in 2000 (3.8 percent) and 2001 (11.7 percent), as shown in Table 
3. If we were to account for internal transportation costs and marketing margins in the 
adjusted reference price, this would reduce its value and lead to a greater computed 
%MPS. Our results are contrary to the average NPR (-3 percent in 2001) calculated on 
the basis of a survey over 100 grain traders and officials by Huang and Rozelle (2003) 
and the PSE results (-1 percent in 2000) of Tian et al. (2002).  
Corn is another major export commodity in China. China is the second largest 
producer and consumer of corn and is among the three largest exporters. Feed demand 
continues to rise as domestic demand for livestock products increases with China￿s 
growing economy. Like wheat, when market prices for corn fell significantly below the 
quota price levels in 1997, the government introduced a protective price less than the 
quota price for out-of-quota corn sales (OECD, 2002). The reductions in quota and 
protective prices, in addition to subsidized exports of corn reduced the pressure on 
government stocks (OECD, 2002). In the long run, corn planted area is expected to be 
constrained by new, more profitable soybean varieties and by increasing vegetable and 
other commercial crop production (USDA, 2002a). 
Although China established a TRQ for corn when it entered the WTO, imports 
have been practically nonexistent in 1990-2003, except in 1995 (Figure 13). China￿s corn 
TRQ was set at 5.850 million tons in 2002 with a one percent in-quota duty, a 60 percent 
over-quota duty, and one-third of the quota allocated to non-state trade. It is reported that 
in addition to the one percent duty, corn imports would be subject to a 13 percent VAT 
while most domestic production is not (USDA, 2002a). The TRQ is scheduled to increase 
to 7.200 million tons in 2004 with the over-quota duty falling to 40 percent and the 
allocation to non-state trade increasing to 40 percent. On the export side, China agreed to 
eliminate export subsidies when it entered the WTO and the government emphasizes that 
its subsidies on exports of corn are applied as WTO-consistent waivers on the VAT on 
exports and to offset internal transport costs (USDA, 2002a).  68 
 We find that the %MPS for corn is positive in all years from 1995-2001, except 
in 1996, following large imports in 1995 (Table 3). In 1997-2001, the %MPS varies from 
0.9 to 14.5 percent, close to the range given by Tian et al (2002) of zero to nine percent. 
The use of export subsidies for corn in recent years has given some protection to corn 
producers. In their survey of grain exporters, Huang and Rozelle (2003) find that China￿s 
domestic corn prices are on average more than 30 percent higher than world prices. Our 
%MPS will underestimate the level of protection if domestic transportation and 
marketing costs are important elements in the calculation of a more accurate adjusted 
reference price.    
 



































































Source: Sun, 2003 for 1990-2002; USDA PSD Database, February 2004 for 2003.  
Note: 2003 refers to trade for October 2002/September 2003. All others are calendar year. 69 
4.4.2   ￿Total￿ PSE  
Using the five commodities for which we have computed the MPS, we can 
calculate the PSE and %PSE for China and again examine the impacts of scaling up. In 
Table 3, MPSc refers to the sum of the nominal MPS for wheat, soybeans, sugar, rice and 
corn. MPS in Table 3 is equal to MPSc divided by the covered share. Budgetary payments 
include input subsidies, relief payments and regional assistance programs, agricultural 
taxes, and forgone agricultural taxes (Sun, 2003). Budgetary payments are negative, for 
example in 1995, when the agricultural taxes dominate the payments. Over the period 
1995-2001, the five commodities share in the total value of production decreases from 44 
percent to 22 percent, and on average accounts for about 32 percent of the total value of 
production. 
As we demonstrated for India, the impact of the scaling up procedure is to 
magnify the MPS for the included commodities. MPS is always greater than MPSc in 
absolute value (Table 3). The nominal PSEc is the sum of MPSc and BP, while the 
nominal PSE is the sum of MPS and BP. Like for India, the nominal PSEc and PSE differ 
in sign for several years. For example in 2000, PSEc is US$ 0.6 billion and the PSE is 
US$ -3.6 billion.  
Table 3 also gives our estimates of the %PSE based on the OECD and trade 
economist approaches and utilizing both the nominal PSEc and the nominal PSE. The 
differences between the OECD and trade economist approaches are small and for several 
years when the %PSE is small, it is actually the same under both approaches. The 
differences between %PSEc and %PSE under both approaches can be large (i.e. in 1996) 
and can differ in sign (i.e. in 2000).  
In Figure 14 we present our estimates of the %PSEc and %PSE (OECD 
denominator) for China based on our five-commodity analysis. We also present the 
results of Cheng and Sun (1998) for select years between 1982-1994 for comparison. 
Compared to their findings, our results seem to indicate that the level of discrimination 70 
against agriculture is decreasing. As for India, the %PSEc tends to be closer to zero and 
less variable over time than the scaled-up %PSE. The %PSE shows a more pronounced 
disprotection in 1996 and 1999. By either measure, the results for 1998 and 2001 indicate 
that policies in China provide producers with very small levels of protection.  










































































Cheng and Sun (1998) PSEc PSE
 
Source: Authors￿ calculations; Cheng and Sun, 1998. 
Note: PSEc is without scaling up; PSE is with scaling up (see text for discussion). 71 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Using different variants of the PSE methodology, we have explored how various 
adjustments and assumptions impact the results for three important agricultural 
commodities (wheat, rice and corn) in India (1985-2002), using disaggregated analysis 
for representative surplus and deficit states, and five important commodities (wheat, rice, 
corn, soybeans, and sugar) in China (1995-2001). The results for India suggest that 
ignoring factors such as internal transport costs, marketing margins and quality 
differences in the computation of the market price support (MPS) component of the PSE 
can result in inaccurate PSEs that may be of the wrong sign. We find that the omission of 
these factors has larger impacts on the PSEs for export commodities than for import 
commodities.  
We demonstrate that other adjustments can also influence the PSE calculations. 
For example, in the OECD approach, the MPS for the covered commodities is ￿scaled 
up￿ to all products based on the share of the covered commodities in the total value of 
production. The impact of the scaling up procedure is to magnify the market price 
support of the included commodities. If the commodity coverage is less than complete, 
the scaling up procedure leads to a MPS of greater absolute value than the MPS for the 
covered commodities, and can result in percentage PSEs of different sign than the non-
scaled up version.  
There are also at least two ways in which the percentage PSE can be computed. 
The PSE can be expressed as a percentage of farm income at domestic prices, with the 
value of production at domestic prices plus budget payments as the denominator. The 
alternative trade economist￿s approach is to express support received by farmers as a 
percentage of the value of their output at farmgate-equivalent international prices. The 
differences between the two approaches are generally small when the magnitude of the 
percentage PSE is small, but can be large, for example when the percentage PSE takes a 
large absolute value. 72 
In addition to these mechanical adjustments, we find that the usual procedure to 
compute the MPS based on a comparison of domestic price to an adjusted reference price 
that corresponds to the current direction of net trade can be problematic, especially when 
a country is near self-sufficiency and thus trade volumes are relatively small. Since there 
are many factors influencing the current direction of trade, net trade status may not be the 
best determinant of which adjusted reference price to use. To address the reference price 
issues, we follow the Byerlee and Morris (1993) procedure to compute the level of 
protection or disprotection relative to the relevant adjusted reference price that would 
exist in the country if the policy interventions were removed. The relevant price could be 
the autarky equilibrium price or the import or export adjusted reference price depending 
on the relationship among the three. Using this procedure, we compute the PSE for the 
three commodities in India, which have frequent changes in the direction of trade and 
stock adjustments over the period of analysis, or have small trade volumes. For example, 
for wheat in India, we find that for eight years the autarky price is the relevant adjusted 
reference price. For China, we do not have sufficient data to follow the Byerlee and 
Morris (1993) procedure and except for wheat the commodities we examine maintain a 
clear trade pattern of being imported or exporter during 1995-2001. This does not 
guarantee that an autarky price would not prevail in absence of interventions and if we 
extend the analysis to include the time period 1985-2003, there are several years when, 
due to production shocks, world price changes or government policy, the direction of net 
trade of major commodities changes. Thus it could be that autarky price would be the 
relevant adjusted reference price in some years, though this would have to be tested 
empirically. 
Overall, our PSEs for India and China show two unique patterns. For India, 
support is largely counter-cyclical, rising when world prices are low (as in the late 1980s 
and 1990s) and falling when world prices strengthen (as in the mid 1990s). For China, a 
trend decline in disprotection is more evident but our analysis is more tentative. The 
contrasting results, if they hold up in further research, may have implications for how the 
two countries view possible outcomes of the WTO Doha Round negotiations on 73 
agriculture. For instance, additional disciplines could be more binding for countries with 
positive PSEs when prices are low. 
Further analysis at state/province and regional levels would provide insights about 
protection and disprotection within geographic sub-regions of these two large developing 
countries. Extending the commodity coverage would provide additional insights into 
whether the results for the included commodities covered here apply to other 
commodities, while continuing the analysis for India and China through 2003, would 
indicate whether the patterns are persisting. Applying the Byerlee and Morris (1993) 
procedure to additional commodities would also be useful. Further country studies would 
allow one to generalize if either a counter-cyclical pattern of protection (or disprotection) 
or a trend decrease in disprotection is observed over time in the PSEs of other developing 
countries. In addition, the results would also be useful inputs into efforts to explain how 
domestic policy reforms and trade liberalization would affect producers across diverse 
developing countries. This paper will serve as a basis for further country analysis.  74 
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